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THE HATE SPEECH CONUNDRUM
AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
ALISON G. MYHRA*

I. INTRODUCTION: HATE, THE FUNCTIONS OF
SCHOOLING, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The First Amendment-free speech landscape has changed, or
at least many are reexamining it. Commentators now regularly
question traditional analysis of limitations on speech and expressive activity. They observe that some types of speech, while historically protected by the First Amendment, nevertheless are
hateful and harmful to their recipients and, furthermore, that the
United States is virtually alone in the Western world in its unrelenting protection of such hurtful and oftentimes subjugating
speech.' The emerging critique and reconsideration of the First
Amendment pits rights of freedom of expression against principles
of equality and pits the libertarian vision against the communitarian vision. The debate over restraints on certain types of harmful

speech is occurring on two levels-the societal and the educational-as hate incidents, virulent attacks based upon race, ethnic

origin, religion,2 sex, and sexual preference, have become disturbingly frequent.
On the societal level, the First Amendment critique has taken

several forms. Some advocate the regulation of pornography, 3 for
example, urging that it subjugates women, undermines sex equal* Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.A., B.S.Ed., University of
North Dakota, 1982; J.D., University of North Dakota, 1985; LL.M., Harvard University,

1991.
1. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 38-39 (1986); Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2341-48 (1989); Martha Minow, Speaking and Writing Against Hate, 11 CARDOZO L. REV.
1393, 1397 (1990).

2. Professor Greenawalt has described the dilemma as one involving "the application
of philosophical insights to serious practical questions." Kent Greenawalt, Insults and
Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 287 (1990). Thus:
Extremely harsh personal insults and epithets directed against one's race,
religion, ethnic origin, gender, or sexual preference pose a problem for
democratic theory and practice. Should such comments be forbidden because
they lead to violence, because they hurt, or because they contribute to
domination and hostility? Or should they be a part of a person's freedom to
speak his or her mind?
Id. at 288.
3. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-17, at 920-28 (2d
ed. 1988).
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ity, and silences women.4 Others similarly reject First Amendment absolutism and seek to establish legal limitations on racist
speech on the grounds that it contributes to the continued dis-

empowerment and subordination of victim group members and to
the continued denial of their civil liberties. 5 Proponents of regulatory measures recognize and acknowledge obstacles created by
well-established First Amendment doctrine 6 but claim that por-

nography and racist speech must be regulated for purposes of protecting and elevating other equally important constitutional
values.7 The pleas for reform require legal recognition of the injuries caused by some language usage, pornography, racial epithets,

and the like, and the legal conclusion that the injuries outweigh
any possible expressive value of these forms of speech."

In the world of higher education, reports of hate incidents,
including racist, sexist, and homophobic speech, as well as deroga4. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985)
[hereinafter Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not A
Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Matsuda, supra note 1.
6. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down an antipornography ordinance adopted by Indianapolis, concluding that it unconstitutionally
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The Seventh Circuit also struck down
a "racial slur ordinance" criminalizing the dissemination of materials promoting and
inciting racial or religious hatred. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978).
7. At the same time, the following events have taken place: lawmakers have
attempted to outlaw flag desecration, see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. -, 110 S,Ct.
2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); the National Endowment for the Arts
has proposed restrictions on funding for artists whose projects are deemed offensive or
obscene, see Allan Parachini, NEA Modifies Obscenity Guidelines;Arts: The Policy Change
Stems From An Apparent Dispute Between the NEA and the Justice Department Over
Whether to Appeal a FederalCourt Ruling That Struck Down the So-CalledAnti-Obscenity
Oath, Los ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991, at 1, col. 4; a federal district court judge has
declared 2 Live Crew's rap album As Nasty As They Wanna Be to be obscene, see
Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 603 (S.D. Fla. 1990); and Simon &
Schuster, notwithstanding its sizeable advance to author Bret Easton Ellis, has refused to
publish American Psycho because of its misogynistic content, see TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at
103. Professor Minow has described the current free speech environment as an "odd and
disturbing historical junction" due to the juxtaposition of efforts to regulate hate speech and
pornography and efforts to prohibit flag birning and to restrict governmental funding of art
thought to be offensive. Minow, supra note 1, at 1403; see also Irving R. Kaufman, Nibble
At Freedom, And Risk Losing It All; FirstAmendment: Tools Dragged Out to Stifle Hateful
Speech Would Disturb Bedrock Principlesof FreeExpression, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 31,
1990, § Metro, Part B, at 7, col. 4 (home ed.) (Judge Kaufman of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reporting that the First Amendment doctrine of free
expression "is undergoing a re-examination" as a result of, inter alia, the flag burning and
public funding of arts issues). Together, these issues are part of a larger, more
encompassing debate about the scope of the constitutional right of freedom of speech.
8. See MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, supra note 4,. at 61-62;
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357; see also KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE
USES OF LANGUAGE 141 (1989) ("For insults, epithets and slurs, and pornography, two
critical questions are: how language is being dominantly used, and whether that use should
be made of legal relevance.").
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tory speech aimed at religious and ethnic groups are legion.9 Few
institutions of higher learning claim immunity from the resurgence of intolerance and its concomitants of verbal and symbolic
discriminatory harassment.'" Intolerance and its manifestations
are particularly problematic in the educational setting, for it is this
context in which the Supreme Court has struggled to implement
judicial remedies designed to eradicate discrimination." Furthermore, the activities that take place in the classroom today have
significant cultural and political implications for the future of society.1 2 The recent hate incidents, therefore, generate complex pol9. See, e.g., THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991 (special issue covering race on campus).

For descriptions of recent hate incidents, see Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollars Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 431-34, 459-61;
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2320, 2332-33, 2370-73; Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First

Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171,
176-78 (1990); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay On Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2128, 2133-37, 2144-50 (1989); Linda Haviland, Note,
Student DiscriminatoryHarassment, 16 J.C. & U.L. 311, 311-14 (1989); John T. Shapiro,
Note, The Call For Campus Conduct Policies: Censorship or Constitutionally Permissible
Limitations on Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 201, 201, 205-07 (1990); Evan G.S. Siegel,
Comment, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offensive
Speech at Colleges and Universities,39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1351-57 (1990).
10. See Ken Myers, Conventioneers Argue Pros, Cons of Restriction on Hate Speech,
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 28, 1991, at 4 (reporting increased incidents of racial
harassment in nearly all sectors of post-secondary education). Interestingly, according to

some commentators, as bigotry, both subtle and flagrant, has become more pervasive on
campuses, the "politically correct" phenomenon, and its requirement that "incorrect"
views (i.e., opposing or contrary views) be suppressed, also has surfaced as a form of
intolerance and has claimed a presence on many college and university campuses. See Nat
Hentoff, 'Politically Correct' at NYU Law, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 3, 1990, at A23
("Some colleges and universities have become known as p.c. campuses. That is, many
students and faculty are obsessed with the need to be politically correct-and with the
corollary need to try to suppress ideas they say are offensively incorrect."); see also Richard
Blow, Mea Culpa, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 32 ("One option, the one I usually
take, is self-censorship, the keeping of politically incorrect thoughts to oneself. But some
white men go further. They repent sins they weren't aware they had committed."); Dinesh
D'Souza, Illiberal Education, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1991, at 51-58 (reporting the
transformation of universities in terms of, inter alia, educational purposes, values, and
climate); William A. Henry III, Upside Down in the Groves ofAcademe, TIME, Apr. 1, 1991,
at 66-69 (reporting "taboos on fields of inquiry" and "bans on language" in many colleges
and universities); Hentoff, supra, at A23 (reporting a dissenting student's response to the
New York University Law School moot court board's withdrawal of a hypothetical case

raising the issue of the propriety of giving child custody to a lesbian mother in the wake of
student protest that fashioning arguments on the father's behalf would be hurtful to a group
of people within the school and thus hurtful to all, and the moot court board's subsequent
release of a substitute hypothetical dealing with homeowner tort liability: "'We were so
unwilling to make a politically incorrect argument-or maybe afraid of being perceived as
agreeing with it-that we fled to the safety of arguing whether or not homeowners have to
trim their trees.' "); accord Steve France, Hate Goes to College, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 49
(reporting Professor Gunther's statement that "he feels almost grateful on the rare
occasions when a student in his constitutional-law class expresses unpopular, retrograde
views against affirmative action or other well-established liberal doctrines.").
11. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954); see also Darryl Brown, Note, Racism and Race Relations in
the University, 76 VA. L. REV. 295, 312 n.64 (1990).
12. See GERALD GRANT, THE WORLD WE CREATED AT HAMILTON HIGH 195 (1988)
("Much of what we become as a nation is shaped in the schoolyard and the classroom.");
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icy issues concerning the goals of the academic community. The
troublesome episodes of discriminatory speech and harassment
also generate legal issues regarding the First Amendment. As one
commentator succinctly has framed the issue, "[s]hould a university limit free speech to create a proper environment for learning?

Or does the very nature of education require exposure to even
3
offensive speech?"'1

Faced with the need to respond in some manner to the hate
speech surfacing on their campuses, more than two hundred colleges and universities have established anti-discrimination codes
containing express provisions regulating verbal and symbolic discriminatory harassment.'" In crafting regulations, schools have
been forced to focus on the two constitutional values of equality
and free expression,' 5 two values to which they are simultaneously
committed. At the same time, however, schools have to come to
recognize that absolute protection of abusive speech undermines
principles of equality and creates hostile educational environments in which not all students participate equally in the learning
process. 16 By necessity, therefore, the efforts of college and university authorities to regulate abusive speech have centered on striking a balance between anti-discrimination policy and equality
values on the one hand, and individual rights of freedom of expres7
sion within the academic community on the other.'
Martha Minow, On Neutrality, Equality, & Tolerance, CHANGE, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 17
(schools "are vehicles for success in America").
13. Melissa Russo, Free Speech at Tufts: Zoned Out, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1989, at A29,
col. 2.
14. See Myers, supra note 10, at 4; see also Patricia B. Hodulik, Prohibiting
Discriminatory Harassment By Regulating Student Speech: A Balancing of FirstAmendment and University Interests, 16 J.C. & U.L. 573, 573 n.1 (1990) (listing several
specific schools); Siegel, Comment, supra note 9, at 1375-76 n. 137 (discussing the University
of Wisconsin's regulation).
15. See Thomas C. Grey, Responding to Abusive Speech on Campus: A Model Statute,
RECONSTRUCrION, Winter 1990, at 50 (noting the competing values of nondiscrimination
and free expression); Hodulik, supra note 14, at 573-74 (same); Lawrence, supra note 9, at
434 (noting the "tension between the constitutional values of free speech and equality").
But see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
DUKE L.J. 484, 489 ("Combating racial discrimination and protecting free speech should be
viewed as mutually reinforcing, rather than antagonistic, goals. A diminution in society's
commitment to racial equality is neither a necessary nor an appropriate price for protecting
free speech.").
16. An attorney for the University of Wisconsin described the constitutional dilemma
in the following way: "Recurring instances of discriminatory behavior undermine
institutional efforts to provide equal access to education and to improve the educational
environment for all students. They also erode the tolerance that is fundamental to the
existence of a university community." Hodulik, supra note 14, at 573.
17. See Grey, supra note 15, at 50 (reporting that Stanford's proposed regulation
attempts to balance anti-discrimination values and free expression values); Hodulik, supra
note 14, at 574 ("Successful and legally-sustainable regulation ultimately requires balancing
values associated with equality of educational opportunity and those related to freedom of
expression in an academic setting.").
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The regulations proposed and adopted by universities do not
enjoy universal support, even among individuals seriously committed to the elimination of racism and other types of prejudice, however, for the precise reason that one of the bedrock principles of
First Amendment jurisprudence "is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable."' 8 For opponents of the campus regulations, the speech restrictions simply do not accord sufficient sensitivity to individual rights of freedom of expression;
indeed, the federal district courts that have considered the issue of
hate speech at the college and university level have revealed a
hostility towards speech limitations and uniformly have rejected
controls at that level. 19
The debate concerning how to respond to verbal and symbolic harassment, and whether the debate is conceived as one
emphasizing the primacy of equality principles, making their fulfillment a precondition to the enjoyment of free speech rights,2 ° or
whether the debate is conceived as one emphasizing tolerance of
offensive and hurtful expression as a societal good,2 ' is important,
for both society and for post-secondary institutions of learning.
Due to the unique status and educational mission of the public
schools, the debate, arguably, is more imporant for these institutions. The public schools, perhaps because they reflect society's
18. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (citations omitted). See also Police Dept.
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("But, above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.") (citations omitted).
19. To date, federal district courts have struck down two university hate speech
regulations. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991)
(court invalidated the University of Wisconsin System's rule prohibiting discriminatory
epithets on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague); Doe v.
University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (court invalidated the
University of Michigan's anti-discrimination code on the grounds that it was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague). In addition, a federal district court in Virginia has
ruled that the First Amendment protects racist student performances at the college and
university level. See Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 773 F.
Supp. 792 (E.D. Va. 1991).
20. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 9, at 437. For Professor Lawrence, the debate
requires reexamination of the First Amendment, for "the traditional civil liberties position
on free speech does not take into account important values elsewhere in the Constitution."
Id. On this view, free speech is meaningless without the precondition of equality: "[E]ven
those values the first amendment itself is intended to promote are frustrated by an
interpretation that is acontextual and idealized, by presupposing a world characterized by
equal opportunity and the absence of societally created and culturally ingrained racism."
Id.
21. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 15, at 487-88. According to Professor Strossen, the
hate speech issue is merely "the perennial debate" whether courts "should continue to
construe the Constitution as protecting some forms of racist expression." Id. She views
equality and free speech as mutually reinforcing constitutional values, and denies that
protecting free speech necessarily results in a diminution in the societal commitment to
equality. See id. at 489.
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dominant values as well as the tensions and conflicts inherent
within those values, 2 have not been spared occurrences of verbal
and symbolic harassment of particular students or groups of students.2 3 The public schools are special places, 2 4 however, and
while they cannot escape societal influences, they ought to be and
theoretically are driven by and committed to egalitarian principles
and ideals, rather than actual societal practices and biases that may
be repressive and discriminatory.25 With respect to public education, therefore, the hate speech debate constitutes an especially
vexing condundrum that requires careful consideration of hate
and its underlying causes, the functions of schooling, and First
Amendment doctrine.
The discomfort that we feel (and should feel) with the prospect of restrictions on hate speech at the societal level and the college and university level should cause us to pause and to consider
fully the implications of regulation, for there are many. Elementary and secondary public schools, however, are different from
society and post-secondary educational institutions, enough so that
hate speech regulations are philosophically and constitutionally
justifiable in that context. Accordingly, public school officials
should have the authority to prohibit hate speech (or verbal discriminatory harassment) within the school setting. Public school
officials must have the authority to promote norms of basic civility
and to establish the preconditions necessary for learning and coexisting to take place.
This authority to regulate involves not a privilege of arbitrary
22. See PHILIP A. CUSICK, THE EGALITARIAN IDEAL AND THE AMERICAN HIGH
SCHOOL: STUDIES OF THREE SCHOOLS vii (1983); JOHN I. GOODLAD, A PLACE CALLED

SCHOOL: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 30, 161 (1984).
23. See, e.g., CUSICK, supra note 22, at 11 (the issue of race and its attendant conflicts
and animosities have dominated some schools); Should There Be Guidelinesfor What Can
Be Printed in a High School Yearbook, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 11, 1990, at J7
(reporting that yearbooks at several local high schools contained racist remarks); Katti Gray,
ACLU to Defend E. Islip Teen with Hitler T-Shirt; Student: First Amendment Rights
Denied, NEWSDAY (Nassau and Suffolk), Sept. 21, 1990, at 24 (reporting that a high school
principal requested that a student take off a T-shirt with "Adolf Hitler European Tour 19391945" emblazoned on the front and including a listing of dates and places that Hitler
invaded, with some, London, for example, crossed out to indicate cancelled
"performances," for the reason that the teachers and the administration viewed the shirt as
anti-Semitic); The November Report; Hair-RaisingPolicies,THE N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1989, at
60, col. 1 (reporting concern over student T-shirt bearing racial or ethnic slurs).
24. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(Court noted "the special characteristics of the school environment").
25. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); CUSICK, supra note 22, at 1
(schools are committed "to an American version of the egalitarian ideal, that is, to provide
each student with an opportunity for social, political, and economic equality"); JOHN
DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 83 (1916); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION 19 (1987).
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discretion to censor, but rather the ability to devise a scheme of
regulation that comports with principles of equality and equal
access to education, the First Amendment as applicable to the
public schools, and normative theories of the educational purposes
and authorities. One dimension of this power involves thoughtful
consideration of hate, its causes, and its effects on target students,
perpetrators, and the learning environment. 6 Another dimension
of this power requires contemplation of nonregulatory countermeasures, including, inter alia, education and training, designed to
elicit student participation in public condemnation and repudiation of hate incidents and to encourage student discussion on the
elimination of inter-group conflict and tension.
This article argues that the public elementary, junior high (or
middle), and senior high schools, as both a prescriptive matter and
a descriptive matter, constitutionally may regulate student hate
speech in order to effectuate the constitutional values of equality
and free speech. We must support schools in their efforts to combat hate ;peech and its underlying causes of prejudice and intolerance. Part II articulates the characteristics of colleges and
universities and their students, contrasts the unique characteristics
of the public schools and their students, and describes the harms
inflicted by verbal assaults. Part II also describes the proferred justifications for hate speech regulations at the college and university
level. The justifications establishing the constitutional permissibility of hate speech regulations at colleges and universities, justifications based upon doctrine governing adults and their activities,
also sustain hate speech regulations promulgated by the public
schools. Restrictions on speech that may be imposed on adults in
the world-at-large may be imposed without question on children
who are students in the public schools. Part III proposes that normative educational values require regulation and, further, that
specific constitutional doctrines fixing the boundaries of First
Amendment freedoms within the public schools allow for regulation of hate speech in the public schools.
26. See William Kaplin, The First Amendment and Liberty on Campus, App. B, at 2
(Jan. 4, 1991) (unpublished manuscript; presented at the American Association of Law
Schools 1990 Annual Meeting, Section on Law and Education, Symposium: Racial
Harassment on Campus).
27. See id.; Minow, supra note 1, at 1404-07. Professor Minow has urged, with respect
to colleges and universities, that exclusive focus on disciplinary codes and First Amendment
arguments is a distraction that "does not directly or adequately address, as a pedagogical
matter, the sources and forms of hate; nor does it address, as a political matter, the
institutional changes needed to make all members of college and university communities
feel welcome and safe." Id. at 1406. Accordingly, disciplinary codes are just one "useful
tool" in combating prejudice. See id.
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THE PARAMETERS OF THE CURRENT DEBATE
ABOUT REGULATING HATE SPEECH: FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION VERSUS EQUALITY
A.

HATE SPEECH AND THE HARMS IT GENERATES: THE
IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT

The resurgence of intolerance 2 has taken a variety of forms,
from discriminatory conduct to harassing verbal and symbolic
speech and expression. 29 Abusive speech consists of epithets or
insults3 0 reflecting stereotypical notions about race, ethnic origin,

religion, sex, and sexual preference. The speaker of epithets and
insults intends to degrade and to disparage, 3 ' whether the epithets
or insults are spoken against another in a one-on-one situation or
against others in a group situation. In both scenarios, the message
is a negative one, attributing what are thought to be less desirable
values or human qualities3 2 to an individual or to a group and conveying unfavorable appraisals about individual worth based solely
upon group membership. 3 Hate epithets and insults thus put
down minorities and outsiders,3 4 marginalize their value as community members, 5 and reinforce bigoted notions that certain
28. Some have noted the correlation between increases in the number of hate
incidents and periods of economic recession. See Minow, supra note 1, at 1405 (one
breeding ground for hate is economic insecurity); Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Is the Country in a
Depression? When the Economy Slumps, So Does the National Psyche, TIME, Dec. 3, 1990,
at 112-13 (escalating racial tension and increased incidents of bias crimes correspond to
economic pressures associated with the anticipated national recession). Several other
hypotheses include: the perceived return to political conservatism and an attitude of
unconcern for minorities; the perceived threats experienced by some white students who
believe that they are in academic competition with minorities receiving special treatment;
and the decline in minority enrollment at colleges and universities. See Haviland, Note,
supra note 9, at 312-13.
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Hodulik, supra note 14, at 573-74
(describing hate incidents experienced by students in the University of Wisconsin system);
cf. Katharine T. Bartlett & Jean O'Barr, The Chilly Climate on College Campuses: An
Expansion of the "Hate Speech " Debate, 1990 DUKE L.J. 574, 575-78 (describing campus
sexism marking the everyday experiences of female college students).
30. In general terms, "epithets are words and phrases that attribute good, bad, or
neutral qualities; but usually epithets are thought of as negative." Greenawalt, supra note
2, at 291. "Many strong insults use coarse language in a highly derogatory way ...." Id.
31. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 145 (1982).
32. Adjectives like stupid, lazy, dirty, greedy, dishonest, and vulgar, for example, come
to mind. See id.; Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2339-40.
33. See Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 291-92; see also GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE
NATURE OF PREJUDICE 181 (1979) (When a speaker employs derogatory terms, "we can be
almost certain that the speaker intends not only to characterize the person's membership,
but also to disparage and reject him.").
34. See Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 291.
35. See Minow, supra note 1, at 1406 (solidarity and community stability require
"tackling people's misunderstandings and preconceptions about one another"); Brown,
Note, supra note 11, at 324 ("Language and behavior that demonstrate an obliviousness to
minority communities stigmatize those communities and marginalize individual's value as
community members.").
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group memberships constitute a sufficient enough reason to deny
equal treatment and opportunity.3 6
Acknowledgment of the specific harms-to both the target
and the speaker and to the others in close proximity 3 7-is necessary and calls for a heightened level of consciousness3 8 about the
ways language can be used to inflict pain and to cause damage to
individuals.3 9 A more capacious conception of injury and a more
36. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 135.
37. The importance of perspective cannot be overemphasized; dealing with hate
speech requires standing in the shoes of the target, the victim. Outsider jurisprudence
stresses the victim's perspective and grounds its methodology in the victim's social reality
and experience. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2324. The idea is to reflect on descriptions of
the life experiences of individuals within subordinated groups and, at the same time, to fit
those experiences within a realist conception of law (law as politics) and establish
prescriptive legal goals that avoid reliance on so-called neutral principles, which tend to
shore-up existing power relationships. See id. at 2324-26. Victims' stories, therefore, are
absolutely essential to the hate speech debate. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 458-66;
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2326-41; Minow, supra note 1, at 1399-1402. In other words, we
must strive to think about abusive epithets and insults from a vantage point other than our
own, unless, of course, the abusive epithets and insults are about us. See id. at 1402; Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Fonard:Justice Engendered, 101 HARV.L. REV.

10, 13-15, 71-74 (1987). Justice Stevens has advocated this approach in connection with
equal protection analysis. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
455 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (evaluating a zoning ordinance affecting a group home
from the perspective of a mentally handicapped person). Professor Lawrence has
summarized the need to listen to the victims as follows:
Not everyone has known the experience of being victimized by racist,
misogynist, and homophobic speech, and we do not share equally the burden of
the societal harm it inflicts. Often we are too quick to say we have heard the
victim's cries when we have not; we are too eager to assure ourselves we have
experienced the same injury, and therefore we can make the constitutional
balance without danger of mismeasurement.
Lawrence, supra note 9, at 459.
38. That the current state of thinking may be characterized as clearly lacking this
heightened consciousness is evidenced by the tendency of dominant-group members to
view hate incidents as aberrations in a society otherwise free from prejudice. See
Lawrence, supra note 9, at 478-79; Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2327; Brown, Note, supra note
11, at 316-17. For this reason,
[t]he mainstream press often ignores these stories [of hate and prejudice],
giving rise to the view of racist and anti-Semitic incidents as random and
isolated, and the corollary that isolated incidents are inconsequential. For
informed members of these victim communities, however, it is logical to link
together several thousand real life stories into one tale of caution.
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2331 (footnotes omitted).
39. The called-for shift in perspective is intended to avoid traditional, abstract analysis,
which is weakened by its detachment from victims' feelings. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at
459 n.108; Minow, supra note 1, at 1399. The detached nature of current analysis takes the
form, "if it's speech then there can'tbe any harm emanating from it." Williams, supra note
9, at 2134 (footnote omitted). To shift focus, however, is to presume that we know how
objectively to discern racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of intolerance. In
actuality, we cannot presume to know what constitutes these forms of hate because, in the
end, their definitions are based on policy choices. See Brown, Note, supra note 11, at 298.
Thus, one problem underlying the hate speech debate is epistemological. See Minow, supra
note 1, at 1397; Brown, Note, supra note 11, at 298-303.
In dealing with hate speech, therefore, we must cautiously be aware that traditional
epistemology holds that there exists objective truth and objective meaning in language and,
further, that traditional epistemology engenders bipolar constructs and notions that a
particular phrase either is or is not racist or sexist. See id. at 302. In order to understand
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expansive view of the people who potentially may suffer injury are

indispensable in considering how to respond to hate incidents, particularly those involving words. In the case of primary and secondary public schools, the concern for the well-being of students and
their capacity to participate in the learning process are of utmost
importance. To the extent that the harms of hate speech affect
students in debilitating ways, the quality of education provided by

the public schools is compromised.
Epithets and insults based on stereotypical traits associated
with historically vulnerable groups have devastating effects on the

individuals against whom the assaultive words are directed. The
most direct harm is immediate mental or emotional distress.40
Like a slap in the face, a. derogatory epithet or insult causes instantaneous injury, inner turmoil, 4 ' in large part because it derides

some unalterable aspect of the recipient's self-identity, such as
race or sex. Professor Delgado has noted that insults of this nature
are
always a dignitary affront, a direct violation of the victim's
right to be treated respectfully. Our moral and legal systems recognize the principle that individuals are entitled
to treatment that does not denigrate their humanity
through disrespect for their privacy or moral worth.... A
racial insult is a serious transgression of this principle
because it derogates by race, a characteristic central to
42
one's self-image.

The ultimate impact of an abusive insult, whether based on race or
some other constitutive component of identity, is to deny the vic-

tim a sense of dignity, resulting in loss of self-esteem, personal
security, and sense of community membership.4 3
and to deal efficaciously with the harms of abusive language, we must seek to avoid reliance
on traditional epistemology and our tendencies
toward traditional, bipolar
conceptualization. See Minow, supra note 1, at 1397 (we must "dislodge the basic
assumption that analysis depends on a series of either/or choices, founded on binary
concepts"); Brown, Note, supra note 11, at 302-03 (once traditional epistemology is
abandoned, it becomes possible to examine the relationship between knowledge and power
and to consider differing interpretive understandings of racism).
40. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 143. In addition, victims may experience
physiological symptoms. Id.; Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2336. For a discussion of the related
harms of racism, see Delgado, supra note 31, at 136-43.
41. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 452.
42. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 143-45 (footnotes omitted). Moreover, the harm
caused by words, racial or otherwise, is greater when they are spoken in front of others or
by an authority figure. See id. at 143.
43. See David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 466
(1987); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2337-38; Note, A CommunitarianDefense of Group Libel
Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682, 690-91 (1988) ("When their identity as members of a
particular religion or race cannot be reconciled with their identity as citizens of a political
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From the victim's perspective, hate messages and their stigmatization also cause long-term psychological harm.4 4 Hate
messages "may cause long-term emotional pain because they draw
upon and intensify the effects of the stigmatization, labeling, and
disrespectful treatment that the victim has previously undergone."145 Feelings of isolation and aloneness are not uncommon.
The psychological effects of hate messages also reinforce feelings
of inferiority and prejudice based upon certain group memberships,46 causing victims to forego opportunities, to avoid certain
places, to engage in self-censorship of speech, and generally to
modify their behavior, demeanor, and outlook.47 Other than
changing their own behavior and daily routine, victims of hate
speech have few avenues of redress; physical assault is inappropriate and forbidden, and the traditional remedy of more speech
within the marketplace
of ideas is unlikely to alleviate the hurt or
48
to provide relief.
Epithets and insults based on stereotypes also affect the
speaker and other individuals who may be exposed to the verbal
assaults. Once a speaker disparages another with words, the
speaker may become isolated and experience strengthened commitment to the underlying prejudice that fueled the insult in the
first place. 49 Furthermore, a speaker's racial, sexual, or other injurious invective is not without impact on nontarget individuals. For
members of the dominant group, feelings of disassociation and
guilt may result from hate messages.5 0 More significantly, dominant-group members may consider the alleged inferiority of the
victim and the victim's group to be a real possibility.5 1
The capability of speech to cause real and substantial damage
to individuals is intensified when the individuals are children or
young adults, who possess even fewer defense mechanisms for
community ....
individuals are denied the opportunity to participate fully in, and find
fulfillment through . . . shared ideals."). For a discussion of racial, ethnic, and religious
identifications as reflective of major components in the processes of self-definition, selfunderstanding, and self-realization, see Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986).
44. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 146; Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 302; Kretzmer,
supra note 43, at 466; Lawrence, supra note 9, at 462.
45. Delgado, supra note 31, at 146.
46. See Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 302. Hate messages, or "verbal tags," contribute
to the continued subordination of historically oppressed groups and maintain the
compliancy of victims. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 144-45.
47. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2337.
48. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-8, at 838-41; Delgado, supra note 31, at 146.
49. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2340 n.101 (discussing psychological and sociological
evidence of injury to the speaker of hate messages).
50. See id. at 2338.
51. See id. at 2339-40.
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coping with the injury suffered. 52 Abusive insults spoken against a
young person, insults that disparage unalterable traits central to
self-identification tend to be especially destructive, causing the
young person to accept and to internalize the hurtful message and
53

to develop a sense of inferiority.
The emotional distress, affronts to dignity, and feelings of
inferiority and disconnectedness from community, in addition to
the undesirable consequences to the speaker and to others, produced by hate messages have serious implications for our understanding of how students learn and, therefore, for the practice of
education and how schools shape their ethos. The psychological

well-being of a student is a prerequisite to meaningful learning
experiences; to the extent that a student harbors feelings of subor-

dination and inadequacy, learning will be impaired. This insight
was central to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 4 where the Court expressly noted that "[a] sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn," which in turn

retards the child's "educational and mental development."5 5 An
important aspect of the Court's equal protection analysis and consideration of psychic injury was context, for the severity of injury is
dependent on the context in which it occurs. 56 In the school con-

text, the safeguarding of a student's psychological well-being,
which is a compelling state interest,5 7 is critical. The emotional
stability and psychological health of students are of constitutional
magnitude and must figure centrally in fashioning responses to
abusive epithets and insults.
The special nature or context of educational institutions has
52. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 147; cf.id. at 142-43 (racism and labeling have a
more injurious impact on children than on adults).
53. See id. at 146.
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). The Court added that
"children's feelings of inferiority as to their status in the community... may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id.; see also Delgado, supra note 31,
at 145 n.67 ("Brown turned, clearly, on the stigmatizing effect-the indignity or affront of
separate schools--because by hypothesis the schools were equal."); Lawrence, supra note 9,
at 462 ("Brown speaks directly to the psychic injury inflicted by racist speech."); Smolla,
supra note 9, at 201 (stigma was the heart of the Court's equal protection analysis in Brown).
The Court has concerned itself with harmful emotional and psychological injury to children
in other settings as well. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parents do
not have the religious freedom to require their children to engage in proselytizing in
contravention of child labor laws because of possible emotional, psychological, or physical
injury to the children).
56. See Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 291, 300; Lawrence, supra note 9, at 437; Strossen,
supra note 15, at 507.
57. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, -, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1696 (1990); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982).
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been grasped by those colleges and universities considering the
First Amendment and disparaging epithets and insults. Professor
Matsuda has provided a description of colleges and universities
that is illuminating in its articulation of their unique features:
Universities are special places, charged with pedagogy,
and duty-bound to a constituency with special vulnerabilities. Many of the new adults who come to live and study
at the major universities are away from home for the first
time, and at a vulnerable stage of psychological development. Students are particularly dependent on the university for community, for intellectual development, and for
self-definition. Official tolerance of racist speech in this
setting is more harmful than generalized tolerance in the
community-at-large. It is harmful to student perpetrators
in that it is a lesson in getting-away-with-it that will have
lifelong repercussions. It is harmful to targets, who perceive the university as taking sides through inaction, and
who are left to their own resources in coping with the
damage wrought. Finally, it is a harm to the goals of
inclusion, education, development of knowledge, and ethics that universities exist and stand for. Lessons of cynicism and hate replace lessons in critical thought and
8
inquiry.
The higher education setting thus has two particularly distinctive
features: a pedagogical mission and students, generally speaking,
of a relatively young age who are not intellectually or emotionally
fully grown.5 9 It is within this learning environment, and the
school's all-encompassing concern for positive student development, that the emotional and psychological harm caused by abu58. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2370-71 (footnotes omitted); cf. Brown, Note, supra note
11, at 313 (The university is special because it is "a singularly powerful institution in the
distribution of wealth. Its primary products, credentials in the form of college degrees, are
limited and valuable commodities.").
59. Professor Matsuda also has provided a description of college and university
students:
The typical university student is emotionally vulnerable for several reasons.
College is a time of emancipation from a pre-existing home or community, of
development of identity, of dependence-independence conflict, of major
decision making, and formulation of future plans. The move to college often
involves geographic relocation-a major life-stress event-and the forging of
new peer ties to replace old ones. All of these stresses and changes render the
college years critical in development of one's outlook on life. College students
experiment with different passions, identities, and risks. A negative
environmental response during this period of experimentation could mar for life
an individual's ability to remain open, creative, and risk-taking.
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2370 n.249.
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sive insults has become the impetus for weighing First
Amendment rights against equality principles.
Although many aspects of the public schools are descriptively
and functionally similar, if not identical, to those of colleges and
universities, there are dissimilarities as well. 6 Like the post-secondary schools, public schools are charged with pedagogy and
engaged in the enterprise of education. Similarly, the population
to which they are committed is composed of individuals who are
not fully grown. On the other hand, students in the public school
systems are younger than their college- and university-level counterparts; they are less intellectually and emotionally developed
and hence correspondingly more impressionable and vulnerable. 1
They assertedly are less capable of dealing with the bombardment
of ideas and information, and thus, the public schools never have
been conceived to be the place for wide-open and robust discussion on any and all matters. 2 State compulsory education laws
make pupil attendance mandatory. 63 Moreover, historically standing in loco parentis and fulfilling parens patriae duties,6 4 the public schools are obligated to provide for the safety and well-being of
all students, perhaps to a greater degree than required of post-secondary schools.65 In addition, value inculcation is one of the
varied purposes of the public schools, but not of colleges and uni60. As one commentator has noted:
The "special characteristics" of the elementary and secondary school
environment include the fact that students, being compelled to attend school,
are a captive audience, that the students are not yet fully developed
intellectually or emotionally, that the educational enterprise has an obligation to
protect the safety of all students and to provide them with an atmosphere
conducive to education, and that the purpose of compulsory education is to
inculcate the social, moral and political values of the community (however
defined) and, in particular, to prepare the young to participate as citizens in our
democratic society.
Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1678 (1986) (footnotes omitted). In
addition, the public schools have a unique social structure, one that is not replicated at the
post-secondary level. See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971).
Moreover, college and university campuses are larger than public school buildings and
grounds, and students spend proportionately more time there. See id. at 808 n.5.
4
61. See Levin, supra note 60, at 1678 n.16 (noting that courts frequently emphasize
the maturity of college students and the relative impressionability of public school
students); William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme Court's
EducationalIdeology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 954 n.83 (1987) (same).
62. See Smolla, supra note 9, at 207 (noting that a university is quite different than a
public elementary or high school because it is "a place of uninhibited public discourse and
should remain so").
63. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.101 (West Supp. 1991).
64. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); EDMUND E. REUTTER, JR., THE COURTS AND
STUDENT CONDUCT 3 (1975).

65. Cf. Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L. REV.
625, 652 (1984) (noting that the public schools are charged with maintaining order).
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versities. Loosely situated among a public school's "social, civic,
and cultural goals," value inculcation involves efforts to assist students in the development of interpersonal understandings, citizen
participation, enculturation, and moral and ethical character. 6
In light of the student constituency of the public schools, in
addition to the sui generis objectives of such institutions, the
capacity of verbal attacks to cause deep emotional and psychological scars in students and to foster feelings of inferiority is potentially greater in the public schools than in colleges and universities.
In short, the frustration of ideals of equality and the subversion of
efforts to develop proper environments for learning are alarming
and more problematic for the public schools than for institutions of
higher education.

B.

CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE AND THE JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR THE REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH

The promotion and protection of free speech throughout society is the central message of prevailing First Amendment doctrine, which "put[s] the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and
more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon
which our political system rests. '6' The exalted position of the
First Amendment in constitutional jurisprudence is thought to be
reflective of and necessary for the safeguarding of values inhering
in liberal democratic government.6 8 Modern constitutional ortho66. GOODLAD, supra note 22, at 52-55. Value inculcation is not emphasized in the
context of higher education. See Senhauser, Note, supra note 61, at 954; see also Suzanna
Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate
Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 933, 942 (1991).
67. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (citation omitted).
68. Many have articulated the values of or justifications for freedom of expression. See,
e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3-5, 47-51 (1989)
(identifying the values of self-realization and self- determination through individual liberty);
BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 8-10, 119-24 (identifying the value of our commitment to
tolerance through which we address the problems of intolerance); THOMAS I. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

6-7 (1970) (identifying the following values of

self-realization and governmental operation: self-fulfillment; advancement of knowledge
and discovery of truth; participation in political decision making; and promotion of a stable

community);

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 18-19, 22-27 (1948) (identifying the value of self-government and limiting
First Amendment protections to public discussion of political issues); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 5-6, 168-69 (1990) (identifying the

value of dissent). For Professor Tribe, the fundamentality of the First Amendment in law
precludes a conception of its value "in purely instrumental or 'purposive' terms." TRIBE,
supra note 3,§ 12-1, at 785 (footnote omitted); see also GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 16-34

86

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:71

69
doxy, therefore, while not protective of all expressive activity,

does not countenance content-based restrictions of speech,70 even
if the speech consists of assaults based on race, ethnic origin, religion, sex, or sexual preference. This is so because "[t]he capacity
of racist [and other] attacks to cause deeply scarring psychic
wounds or to undermine the values of racial [and other types of]
equality and harmony that make meaningful community possible
are discounted as harms too ephemeral to justify content-based
speech restrictions."7 The libertarian model--emphasizing individual rights and autonomy and authorizing governmental action
or intervention only when absolutely necessary to prevent one
individual from prejudicially interfering with the interests of
another 72-takes a dim view of "[r]aising the level of public discourse or improving sensitivity to communal values ....73 Nonetheless, the emotional and psychological harms resulting from
abusive speech are real and difficult to ignore, 74 even under the
(discussing consequentialist justifications and nonconsequentialist justifications for freedom
of speech).
69. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(per curiam). For a brief discussion of the forms of speech that may be restricted or denied
protection altogether, see Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2354-56.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. -., 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
71. Smolla, supra note 9, at 172 n.3.
72. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 141-42 (1859) (G.Himmelfarb ed. 1985). In
the words of John Stuart Mill:
The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others or wanting in due
consideration for their welfare, without going to the length of violating any of
their constitutional rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion,
though not by law. As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially
the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether
the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes
open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question
when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or
needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age
and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases, there should be
perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
Id.
73. Smolla, supra note 9, at 174. In contrast, the Aristotelian or communitarian vision
that law should bind individuals together in a just community allows for the state to control
speech: "Speech that promotes the good life and that affirms values of community, justice,
and the rule of law will be fostered and nurtured by the state; speech destructive of those
ends will be condemned." Id. at 173. For discussions of the reformulation of notions of
community and republicanism within the realm of law and politics, see Paul W. Kahn,
Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989); Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Croups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
74. See supra notes 28-57 and accompanying text.
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libertarian model, 5 as are the numerous hate incidents that have
plagued schools across the nation. In the words of Professor
Kalven, "[s]peech has a price. It is a liberal weakness to discount
so heavily the price. "76
The price of allowing harassing epithets and insults within the
school setting is some diminution in equality,77 another value that
figures centrally in the hierarchy of constitutional values. Hate
messages directed at students who are members of particular
groups cause stigma, one of the very evils that modem equal protection principles seek to eradicate.7 8 The problem is that "[t]he
constitutional commitment to equality and the promise to abolish
badges and incidents of slavery are emptied of meaning when target-group members must alter their behavior.., because of hate
group activity." 7 9 Thus, when speech reduces itself to the level of
epithets and slurs attacking race, ethnic origin, religion, sex, and
sexual preference, it is precisely at this point that free speech values and equality values cross and tension develops. In addition, it
is precisely at this point that the communitarian vision directly
conflicts with the libertarian vision. For this reason, proponents of
the regulation of hate speech "must choose whether to fight this
battle purely in Aristotelian [or communitarian] terms or whether
to meet the libertarians half-way by trying to convince the libertarians that the communal goals of tolerance and equality can be
accommodated within the libertarian framework of free expression and an open marketplace.- 8 0 The libertarian commitment to
neutral principles8 ' of freedom of speech, however, need not
become an obsession8 2 that forecloses the possibility of regulating
75. After all, speech that disparages and hurts individuals is not easily defended in
terms of the values which liberalism seeks to defend. See supra note 68.
76. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
xxii (Jamie Kalven ed. 1988).
77. See supra notes 28-57 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke Justice Brennan emphatically stated: "[R]acial classifications that stigmatizebecause they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because
they put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid
without more." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1979) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
79. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2377 (footnote omitted).
80. Smolla, supra note 9, at 175.
81. According to Professor Tribe, "neutral principles" are not really so neutral, for the
application of seemingly neutral First Amendment principles in particular cases "tilt[s]
decidedly in the direction of existing concentrations of wealth and influence." LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 189 (1985); see also Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2322
(describing our collective commitment to freedom of discourse as "dangerously fickle").
82. See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 219. In this regard, Professor Tribe's comments go to
the heart of the matter:
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hate speech within the public schools in a constitutionally permissible way in order to advance equality and to minimize the stigmatization of students.

College and university efforts to combat abusive speech have
entailed the search for an analytic methodology that comports
with First Amendment principles and, at the same time, affords
ample respect to equality. The efforts clearly have been directed
towards the accommodation of community values within the lib-

ertarian model of freedom of expression as the free trade of ideas
in the marketplace. The search has generated heated debate
between those constitutional scholars who believe that abusive,

hurtful speech should be prohibited and those constitutional scholars who believe that such hateful speech should be immune from
all school regulation. 3 Notwithstanding the diametrically
opposed First Amendment outlooks, proponents of regulation
have articulated theoretical rationales for controls on abusive

speech grounded in a range of free speech approaches. And in
doing so, they have avoided the abandonment of communitarian
virtue.
The First Amendment arguments supporting school regulation borrow from a number of doctrinal approaches. 8 4 NotwithVoltaire's grandiose pledge to defend to the death another's right to say that
with which the philosophe could never agree is in many respects admirable. But
a commitment to protect evenhandedly the expression of all sentiments can
degeneratefrom an abidingfaith in the First Amendment to an obsession with
the "alluringabstractions"of neutral principles. Before one martyrs oneself in
the name of free speech on behalf of those who would make atrocity a virtue,
one should at least pause to reflect upon the fact that martyrdom has always
been stronger proof of the intensity than of the correctness of a belief.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
83. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 434 (discussion of the debate); Strossen, supra note
15, at 487-91 (same); see also France, supra note 10, at 44-49. The debate is troublesome in
that it "has caused considerable soul-searching by individuals with long-time commitments
to both the cause of political expression and the cause of racial equality." Lawrence, supra
note 9, at 434. Professor Smolla has added:
A personal dimension to this conflict exists. Many of the more eloquent
exponents of controls on racist and sexist speech are persons who often have
thought of themselves as libertarians or at least as part of a coalition in which
libertarians have been their allies. It is not easy to be portrayed as against free
speech and civil liberties by the same persons with whom you have fought so
many battles for civil rights.
Smolia, supra note 9, at 175.
Professor Strossen, General Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union, has refused
to acknowledge the existence of a dichotomy between free speech and equality. See Strossen, supra note 15, at 489. She has argued that civil libertarians are committed to both the
elimination of discrimination and the promotion of free speech. See id. at 488. Accordingly, her characterization of the "debate" is different: "Because civil libertarians have
learned that free speech is an indispensable instrument for the promotion of other rights
and freedoms-including racial equality-we fear that the movement to regulate campus
expression will undermine equality, as well as free speech." Id. at 489.
84. Professor Kaplan has prepared a comprehensive shopping list of regulatory
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89

standing the strong presumption against limitations on speech and
expressive activity, three constitutionally sanctioned rationales are
particularly relevant in thinking about responses to hate speech in
the school environment.8 5 One strategy of some colleges and universities seeking to restrict hate speech on their campuses is to
invoke the fighting words doctrine, a "no value" speech approach.
Another regulatory rationale is the "low value" speech approach,
which authorizes less than complete protection for some forms of
speech when the government can establish a substantial interest
for the speech infringement. Other colleges and universities rely
upon a "full value" speech approach, establishing internal regulation based upon compelling interests, such as the prevention of
psychological harm and the guarantee of equal educational opportunity.8 6 Although articulated by colleges and universities to
rationales, which is contained in the outline of his proposed process for managing the free
speech aspects of harassment on campus, and which provides in part:
VI. Internal Regulation: Devising Regulatory Theories (matching the shopping
list items--from V [a listing of situations for which internal regulation is a
priority] above-to free speech approaches that would support regulation)
A. "Non-speech" approach
B. "Speech-neutral" approaches
1. Expressive conduct combined with non-expressive conduct
2. Time, place, or manner restrictions
C. "No value speech" approaches (fighting words)
D. "Low value speech" approaches
E. "Full value speech" approaches
1. Incitement
2. Captive audiences and invasions of privacy
3. Compelling state interests: equal educational opportunity
F. Approaches based on revisionist free speech theories
1. Protecting against psychic injury
2. Promoting tolerance and civility
Kaplin, supra note 26, App. B, at 3.
85. For discussions of the propriety of rationales grounded in tort law, see Doe v.
University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862-63 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Chad Baruch, Dangerous Liaisons: Campus Racial Harassment
Policies, the FirstAmendment, and the Efficacy of Suppression, 11 WHrIrIER L. REV. 697,
707-08 (1990) (group defamation); Delgado, supra note 31, at 151-59, 175, 179-81
(intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, group defamation, and a new tort
action for racial insults); Marjorie Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That
Wound," 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585, 589-92 (1983) (defamation and group
defamation); Lawrence, supra note 9, at 462-64 (defamation and group defamation);
Strossen, supra note 15, at 514-20 (intentional infliction of emotional distress and group
defamation); Note, supra note 43, at 684-89 (group defamation). State tort law is designed
to protect the sensibilities of individuals and to limit the anguish that victims suffer as a
result of their victimization. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991). For a discussion advocating formal criminal and
administrative sanctions for racist speech, see generally Matsuda, supra note 1.
86. The "no value" and "full value" regulatory theories fit within the speech-protective
"two-tier" analysis under which courts traditionally have evaluated content-based
restrictions on speech. Under the two-tier analysis, a content-based regulation of expression
is unconstitutional, unless the regulated expression falls into a clearly delineated categorical
exception to protection, or the regulation itself is necessary to further a compelling state
interest. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 178-81. Accordingly,
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address campus hate speech, these justifications have equal application in the context of the public schools.8 7
1) A "No Value" Speech Approach: The Fighting Words
Doctrine
Since 1942 "fighting words" have constituted a categorical
exception to protected speech. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire8 8 the Supreme Court considered the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who, after being warned by a city marshall that his
acts of proselytizing8 9 were causing the gathering crowd to grow
restless, called the marshall "a God damned racketeer" and "a
damned Fascist" and described the government of the City of
Rochester as "Fascists or agents of Fascists." 90 The statute under
which he was convicted proscribed public insults that were "offensive, derisive or annoying." 9 1 Plainly, the words of Mr. Chaplinsky
were of a political nature.92 Yet, the Court reasoned that some
some speech enjoys full, but not absolute, constitutional protection, while other forms of
speech, like so-called fighting words and libel, do not enjoy any elevated status or
protection. See TRtIBE, supra note 3, §§ 12-18, at 928-44; Note, The Supreme Court, 1989
Term-Leading Cases, 104 HAHV. L. REV. 237,242-43 (1990). The "low value" approach, in
contrast, is a doctrinal development of relatively recent origin and is an intermediate
category; speech deemed to fall into this category is thought to be less valuable and thus
entitled to less than complete First Amendment protection. See id.
87. The analysis of constitutional issues within the debate about hate speech on college
and university campuses has relied, to a significant degree, upon cases concerning the
public schools. See, e.g., Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863 (citing, inter alia, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), and noting that had the University of Michigan antidiscrimination policy "had the effect of only regulating" the speech found in Bethel to be
unprotected when expressed in a high school, "it is unlikely that any constitutional problem
would have arisen"); Hodulik, supra note 14, at 576, 579-81 (relying, in part, upon Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), to argue in favor of the University of Wisconsin hate speech
regulation); Lawrence, supra note 9, at 438-39 (relying on Brown to argue in favor of
college and university hate speech regulations); Siegel, Comment, supra note 9, at 1377 &
n.140 (citing numerous cases involving freedom of expression within the public schools as
relevant to colleges and universities, and expressly noting that "[a]lthough Tinker
concerned a public high school, the principles underlying the decision apply with equal
force to freedom of expression in the context of a college or university"). There is no
principled reason not to consider in the public school context the regulatory justifications
developed in the college and university context.
88. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
89. Mr. Chaplinsky's acts of proselytizing included the distribution of Jehovah's
Witness literature and the denouncement of all religion as a "racket." Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569-70 (1942).
90. Id. at 569.
91. Id. The state statutory provision provided in full as follows:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other
person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence
and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from
pursuing his lawful business or occupation.
92. See GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 293.
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epithets and insults simply are not protected under the First
Amendment:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or fighting words'--those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.9 3
Based upon a limiting construction of the state supreme court,9 4
the Court held that the statute was constitutionally sound, for it
did no more than prohibit the utterance of face-to-face words
likely to cause violence or breach of the peace. 95
96
Chaplinsky represents a minor concession to censorship
premised on the principle that personal epithets and insults can be
without "social value" and do not necessarily contribute in a
meaningful way to the "exposition of ideas."'9 7 Accordingly, the
Court unequivocally removed several categories of speech from
protection under the First Amendment,9 8 including words that
93. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
94. The New Hampshire Supreme Court previously had declared that the statute's
objective was the preservation of public order, and therefore it prohibited only those words
having a "direct tendency to cause acts of violence" by the person to whom the words were
directed. Id. at 573. Under the state court's construction, the statute prohibited only those
words that "men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause
an average addressee to fight." Id.
95. Id.
96. See KALVEN, supra note 76, at 80.
97. Two years prior to Chaplinsky, the Court had noted a concern with personally
provocative and abusive assaults: "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its
punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument." Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
98. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72; BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 179. To attempt to
isolate expression thought to be without social value may be viewed as an attempt to
"'purify" discourse. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-8, at 839; cf.ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
MORALITY OF CONSENT 72-73 (1975) (arguing that a certain civil quality to public discourse
is good); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 909 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting
that a hallmark of civilized society is the level and quality of discourse). On this view, "the
First Amendment protects information and ideas but neither all possible ways of packaging
them nor all possible ways of unearthing and deploying them." TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-8,
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provoke violence or that incite an immediate breach of the peace
and words that inflict injury by their mere utterance.
Though nearly fifty years old, Chaplinsky remains the leading
case on the fighting words doctrine. In subsequent decisions, the
Court has neither engaged in rigorous analysis of the doctrine nor
outlined its boundaries with any systematic clarity. In a series of
opinions, for example, the Court invalidated various breach of the
peace and other statutes purporting to proscribe abusive and
offensive language on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness. 9 In
Gooding v. Wilson' 0 0 the Court struck down as unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad a Georgia statute criminalizing "opprobrious
words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the
peace,"
because earlier state court decisions had applied the
statute "to utterances where there was no likelihood that the per02
son addressed would make an immediate violent response,"'
thereby going beyond the fighting words defined by Chaplinsky.
Similarly, in Lewis v. City of New Orleans 1 3 the Court invalidated
a city ordinance prohibiting "opprobrious language 104 on the
basis of overbreadth, because the prohibition embraced "words
that do not 'by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.' ""05 Notwithstanding the
Court's lack of any express elaboration of the contours of the doctrine, however, Gooding and Lewis, and the subsequent remands
of convictions in light of these two opinions, 10 6 suggest that a key
element of the fighting words doctrine is the presence of a serious
risk of violence.10 7 The context in which the hurtful epithets are
at 839. The purification of discourse, of course, reasonates with the communitarian model.
See supra note 73.
99. See, e.g., Kelly v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923 (1974); Rosen v. California, 416 U.S. 924 (1974);
Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974);
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1973); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901
(1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
100. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
101. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972).
102. Id. at 528.
103. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
104. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974).
105. Id. at 133.
106. For a list of cases remanded in light of Lewis, see supra note 99.
107. See BOLLINGER, supra note 1, at 180 ("the exception for 'fighting words' has
survived a series of different courts and cases testing its limits, though now it is commonly
said to be narrowly defined by the case law... to apply only to personally insulting remarks
made in face-to-face encounters"); GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 294 ("Many observers
have concluded that no restriction of abusive speech outside of special settings is
constitutionally acceptable unless there is a serious risk of violence."); KALVEN, supra note
76, at 106-08; TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-18, at 929 n.9 (the fighting words doctrine has been
"narrowly construed" and "restricted"); Heins, supra note 85, at 588-89 (the fighting words
doctrine has been limited); Smolla, supra note 9, at 198-99 (the one kernel of Chaplinsky
that survives is the concern for "a clear and present danger of a violent physical reaction");
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08
made is thus critical.1

The scope of the fighting words doctrine of Chaplinsky also
must be viewed in the light of Cohen v. California,10 9 the case in
which the Supreme Court explicitly held that the First Amendment protects the emotive part of speech, as well as the cognitive

part." 0 The Court recognized that expression is largely a matter
of personal taste and style, and that some distasteful and offensive
words are chosen as a vehicle of expression precisely for their
shock value:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative

function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much
for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of
the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no

regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the

overall message sought to be communicated."'
Cohen thus dictates that "the profane" is to receive constitutional
protection; to the extent that Chaplinsky intimated otherwise,

Cohen "weakened
the conceptual foundation of the fighting words
'' 2
doctrine."
In responding to abusive speech on campus, various colleges
Strossen, supra note 15, at 508-10 (the Court has narrowed the construction of
constitutionally permissible prohibitions on fighting words).
108. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-10, at 850-51; Strossen, supra note 15, at 509, 525.
109. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
110. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). In Cohen the appellant was convicted
under a breach of the peace statute prohibiting "offensive conduct" for wearing a jacket
bearing the phrase "Fuck the Draft" in the hallway of the county courthouse. Id. at 16-17.
The issue presented was whether California could
excise, as 'offensive conduct,' one particular scurrilous epithet from the public
discourse, either upon the theory ... that its use is inherently likely to cause
violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that the States, acting as
guardians of public morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the
public vocabulary.
Id. at 22-23. The Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 26.
111. Id. at 26.
112. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-18, at 929 n.9; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at
294 ("After Cohen, it is extremely hard (without rejecting Cohen) to argue that everything
that might amount to fighting words is simply without expressive value and thus falls wholly
outside the First Amendment."); KALVEN, supra note 76, at 110 (the net effect of Cohen "is
thus to curtail the potential scope of Chaplinsky and to extend the protection of the First
Amendment to offensive speech."); Heins, supra note 85, at 587-88 (Cohen imposed limits
on the fighting words doctrine); Smolla, supra note 9, at 198 n.103 ("Chaplinsky is foolishly
simplistic . . . in maintaining that emotive speech is no part of the family of protected"
speech.).
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and universities have seized the fighting words doctrine as a theoretical model for regulatory measures. With respect to abusive
epithets and slurs, the common direction of Chaplinsky, the wellestablished restrictions on breach of the peace statutes, and Cohen
"has been to demand very narrowly drawn statutory language
focusing on imminent violence."' 13 Stanford University,' 14 for
example, adopted a regulation "intended to clarify the point at
which protected free expression ends and prohibited discriminatory harassment begins[;]" thus, the regulation proscribes "personal vilification," that is, intentional face-to-face epithets and
insults, directed at individuals or small groups of individuals,
which "convey direct and visceral hatred or contempt for human
beings on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin." 1 5 In accordance
113. GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 295. But see Heins, supra note 85, at 588 (arguing
on the one hand that the fighting words doctrine has been limited, and on the other "that
despite its continuing references to Chaplinsky the Court will no longer permit convictions
for uttering offensive words to stand, whether the words be insulting, racist, or otherwise
abusive"); Strossen, supra note 15, at 508-10, 524-25 (arguing on the one hand that the
fighting words doctrine has been "substantially limited in scope," and on the other that the
doctrine "is no longer good law").
114. Although a private institution, and thus not bound by the First Amendment,
Stanford University, like a number of private universities, treats itself as so bound as a
matter of policy. See Grey, supra note 15, at 54; HARVARD UNIVERSITY GAZETTE, Mar. 15,
1991, at 1, col. 4 (reporting, in the context of a debate regarding a student's display of a
Confederate flag, President Derek Bok's statement that while there is some question as to
what extent the First Amendment is enforceable against private institutions, Harvard
University should be concerned with freedom of expression and the power of censorship).
For a discussion of First Amendment applicability to private colleges and universities, see
Siegel, Comment, supra note 9, at 1378-98.
115. STANFORD UNIVERSITY, FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION: FREE
ExPRESSION AND DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT §§ 3-4 (adopted June 1990). The
FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION provides in full as follows:
1. Stanford is committed to the principles of free inquiry and free expression.
Students have the right to hold and vigorously defend and promote their
opinions, thus entering them into the life of the University, there to flourish
or wither according to their merits. Respect for this right requires that
students tolerate even expression of opinions which they find abhorrent.
Intimidation of students by other students in their exercise of this right, by
violence or threat of violence, is therefore considered to be a violation of the
Fundamental Standard.
2. Stanford is also committed to principles of equal opportunity and nondiscrimination. Each student has the right to equal access to a Stanford
education, without discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, handicap,
religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin. Harassment of
students on the basis of any of these characteristics contributes to a hostile
environment that makes access to education for those subjected to it less
than equal. Such discriminatory harassment is therefore considered to be a
violation of the Fundamental Standard.
3. This interpretation of the Fundamental Standard is intended to clarify the
point at which protected free expression ends and prohibited discriminatory
harassment begins. Prohibited harassment includes discriminatory
intimidation by threats of violence, and also includes personal vilification of
students on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin.
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with Chaplinsky, the abusive words must "by their very utterance

inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace."'1 16 Professor Grey, the drafter of the Stanford regulation,
adopted the concept of "personal vilification" to outline the contours of fighting words within the discrimination context and to
17
ensure the narrowness of the scope of the prohibited speech."

The University of Wisconsin also borrowed key elements from
Chaplinsky's fighting words doctrine in drafting its regulation proscribing discriminatory expression."'
Parallels between abusive speech and fighting words that
incite violent reaction are apparent and have not gone unnoticed.
Verbal assaults have immediate, injurious impact, like a slap in the
face. 1 9 By their intended impact, verbal assaults also serve to

limit dialogue and discussion and to silence the person to whom
they are directed.12 0 Professor Lawrence has explained:
4.

Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by personal vilification if
it:

a)

is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small number of
individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or national and ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it insults or
stigmatizes; and
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or non- verbal symbols. In the
context of discriminatory harassment by personal vilification, insulting or
"fighting" words or non-verbal symbols are those "which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite to an immediate breach of the
peace," and which are commonly understood to convey direct and
visceral hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis of their sex,
race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic
origin.
Id.
116. Id. § 4.
117. See Grey, supra note 15, at 53.
118. See Hodulik, supra note 14, at 582-84. A federal district court determined that
the Wisconsin regulation was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See UWM Post, Inc.
v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991). Given the court's rationale,
the language of the Wisconsin provision is instructive. The Wisconsin regulation exempts
from First Amendment protection words that are spoken intentionally and directly to an
individual fot purposes of demeaning that individual on the basis of certain characteristics
and that create an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment. The Wisconsin
proscription provided in part as follows:
The university may discipline a student in nonacademic matters in the following
situations: (2Xa)For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other
expressive behavior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at
different individuals, or for physical conduct, if such comments, epithets, other
expressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education,
University-related work, or other University-authorized activity.
WIs. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 17.06(2).
119. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 452.
120. See id. at 452-53.
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Assaultive racist speech functions as a preemptive strike.
The racial invective is experienced as a blow, not a prof-

fered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that
dialogue will follow. Racial insults are undeserving of
[F]irst [A]mendment protection because the perpetrator's intention is not to discover truth or initiate dialogue

12
but to injure the victim.
Such assaults do not foster more speech, nor do they assist in the

ascertainment of truth; "[t]hey are instead the kinds of words that
incite reaction and cause harm without any opportunity for
reply.' 1 2 2 In short, verbal slaps in the face incite reaction on the
part of the recipient; sometimes, however, they silence the recipi-

ent or cause the recipient to flee.' 2 3 No matter what the response,
the degree to which additional speech is discouraged is the
4
2

same. 1

Narrowly drawn regulations intended to prohibit discriminatory and abusive speech that is likely to trigger reactions are viable
responses. Abusive speech can take many shapes and forms, and a
regulation embodying the incitement prong of the fighting words
doctrine will effectively redress the harms caused by multitudinous varieties of abusive speech. Still, the question of efficacy
remains: do regulations drafted solely in accordance with the
incitement to violence strand of Chaplinsky reach all of the discriminatory speech that schools may seek to proscribe? Some
commentators think not, claiming that by requiring proof of
incitement to violence, the prohibition's utility is limited to combating only a very few forms of harmful speech. 125 Furthermore,
121. Id. at 452 (footnote omitted).
122. Hodulik, supra note 14, at 583.
123. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 452 (discriminatory epithets and slurs may
provoke a violent response or may result in silence or flight); accord HARRY KALVEN, JR.,
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14-15 (1965) (discriminatory epithets and slurs do
not necessarily result in violent reaction).
124. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 452.
125. See, e.g., Baruch, supra note 85, at 705 ("While certain instances of racial

harassment will undoubtedly fall within the fighting words exception to the first
amendment, most instances will not."); Smolla, supra note 9, at 199 ("A mere fighting words
statute [proscribing verbal assaults directed at a particular individual and presenting a clear
and present danger of violent reaction]... will reach almost none of the racist and sexist
speech that proponents of controls seek to proscribe."); Strossen, supra note 15, at 492-93
(claiming that the Stanford rule leaves untouched many harms of abusive speech which
advocates of regulation seek to redress). But see Grey, supra note 15, at 53 (with respect to
the Stanford regulation, the term "fighting words" should not "be read to imply that an
actual threat or likelihood of violent response is a necessary element for application of the
'fighting words' concept; statements that in themselves constitute 'fighting words' do not
become protected speech simply because their immediate victims are, for example, such
disciplined practitioners of non-violence, or so physically helpless, or so cowed and
demoralized, that they do not, in context, pose a realistic physical threat").
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there is an analytical weakness in utilizing the fighting words
incitement to violence prong to respond to hate speech: with
respect to the "'fighting words' approach . . .there is an incongruity between the real reason for the [hate speech] policy (avoidance of racially discriminatory humiliation and emotional distress)
and the constitutional reason (avoidance of violence), the doctrinal
box into which
the draftsmen are attempting to make the real rea26
son fit.'

1'

The conceptual framework of the fighting words doctrine,
however, also embraces words "which by their very utterance
infict injury."' 2 7 The post-Chaplinsky restrictions on breach of
the peace statutes and the Court's decision in Cohen did not
address words that injure merely by being spoken. Thus, any con-

clusion that this second prong is no longer good law may be drawn
too quickly, for since Chaplinsky the Court neither has elaborated
on it on the merits nor rejected it in an express way. 1' Indeed,

Gooding and Lewis, and the subsequent reversals of convictions
for "fighting words" in light of these two cases, 129 involved overbreadth and vagueness analyses, not substantive analysis of words
30
that injure.'
Significantly, although the first prong of Chaplinksky's fighting words definition was dictum, 13 1 the Court, in defining fighting
words, has cited it with approval on a number of recent occasions. 132 In City of Houston v. Hill' 3 3 the Court invalidated as
126. REPORT OF PRESIDENT'S AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON RACIAL HARASSMENT,
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (Nov. 27, 1989) quoted in Strossen, supra note 15, at 515
n.153.
127. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
128. As one commentator has explained:
It is important to remember, however, that group epithets can themselves often
be fighting words. An account of both branches of this subject is a bit
unsatisfactory. Although dispositions that evade certain critical issues and hints
thrown out here and there have led most observers to agree about the drift of
the Supreme Court's understanding, it has been some decades since the Court
has actually attempted to elaborate with clarity what counts as punishable
fighting words and whether or not "defamation" of entire classesof people can
be punished; even when the Court has spoken to these matters, it has hardly
been with systematic rigor.
GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 293 (emphasis added).
129. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
130. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 173 n.241.
131. See Strossen, supra note 15, at 508.
132. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974) (citing
Chaplinsky and Gooding and noting that fighting words are those words which "by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"); Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972) (citing Chaplinsky and noting that fighting words are
"those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace").
133. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:71

overbroad a city ordinance forbidding speech that interrupted a
police officer in the performance of his or her duties. 134 In reaching its conclusion, however, the Court in no way questioned the
authority of states and municipalities to prohibit fighting words,
which, importantly, the Court (citing Chaplinsky and Gooding)
defined both as words that inflict injury by their very utterance
and words that tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 3 '
Moreover, in Doe v. University of Michigan' 6 the federal district
court observed that if the University's hate speech regulation proscribed only fighting words, as defined in Chaplinsky to include
both words that injure merely by being uttered and words that
tend to incite violent reaction, 137 "it is unlikely that any constitutional problem would have arisen."' 38 In light of these developments, Justice Powell's dissent in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey 139 from
the Court's vacation and remand of a conviction for "fighting
words" is informative:
Perhaps appellant's language did not constitute
"fighting words" within the meaning of Chaplinsky....
But the exception to First Amendment protection recognized in Chaplinsky is not limited to words whose mere
utterance entails a high probability of an outbreak of
physical violence. It also extends to the willfull use of
scurrilous language calculated to offend the sensibilities of
140
an unwilling audience.

Regulations proscribing discriminatory and abusive speech
intended to cause injury and to offend are not necessarily foreclosed by the case law 14 1 and deserve consideration, because their
broader theoretical underpinning allows 1for
greater reach in
42
terms of the harms sought to be redressed.
134. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987).
135. See id. at 463 n.12.
136. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
137. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
138. Id. at 863.
139. 408 U.S. 901, 903-09 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
140. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
141. Presented with the question of the constitutional permissibility of a school
regulation prohibiting abusive speech that inflicts injury by its very utterance, the Court
would not need to overrule any cases in order to sustain the regulation. See GREENAWALT,
supra note 8, at 295 & n.33. At a minimum, the Court "could say 'this precise issue has not
been presented." Id. at 295 n.33.
142. Nearly all of the fighting words cases have involved words spoken to police
officers. See, e.g., Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130 (1974); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); see also Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words As Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531,
548 (1980) (noting that fighting words cases in the lower courts almost always involve words
spoken to police officers); Strossen, supra note 15, at 512 (agreeing with Professor Gard's
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2) A "Low Value" Approach: The Sliding-Scale of Social

Value
In contrast to the "no value" speech approach, under which

some types of speech, such as fighting words, are categorically
exempted from First Amendment protection,

43

the "low value"

speech approach accords some types of speech "lower value" by
virtue of their content. This is done by balancing competing interests and generally by allowing governmental regulation for purposes of promoting less-than-compelling state interests.' 4 4 The
theory driving this approach holds that certain forms of expression
inherently lack social value 1 45 and fail to advance "the historical,
political, and philosophical purposes that underlie the [F]irst
[A]mendment. '1 46 Pursuant to this doctrinal model, in a departure from the traditional two-tier conception under which speech
either is or is not protected, 1 47 the Court has fashioned intermediate categories of expression, categories deemed to occupy lower
rungs on the recognized hierarchy of First Amendment values
and, therefore, entitled only to variable First Amendment protection. In effect, the Court has charted a course of judicial reclassification of certain types of speech, a course requiring judicial
assessment of the value of the category of speech at issue. Among
the intermediate categories of speech that members of the Court
have designated as low value are offensive speech, 1 48 child por5
50
nography, 49 near-obscene speech,1 and commercial speech.1 '
assertion). Indeed, the addressee in Chaplinsky was a police officer. See Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942). Police officers, of course, enjoy positions of relative
power vis-a-vis the speakers. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 453 n.92. Recently, the
Supreme Court apparently has recognized this power discrepancy and suggested that the
Chaplinsky fighting words doctrine has narrower application in cases involving words
directed at police officers. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987) (quoting
Lewis, 415 U.S. at 933 (Powell, J., concurring)). The Court's willingness to vacate and
remand convictions based upon overbreadth and vagueness doctrines when the offended
party is a police officer, however, does not require the Court to follow the same course
when the victim of a verbal assault is instead the member of a historically subordinated and
vulnerable group. Lack of relative power is a significant distinction, one suggesting the
validity of a different result in the case of the victim who is verbally assaulted on the basis of
some trait. stereotypically attributed to the group of which the victim is a member.
143. See supra notes 88-142 and accompanying text.
144. See Note, supra note 86, at 243.
145. See Philip J. Prygoski, Low-Value Speech: From Young to Fraser,32 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 317, 318 (1987). See generally TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-18, at 928-44; Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornographyand the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589.
146. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 194 (1983).
147. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
148. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion).
149. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982).
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" The facts in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.1 5 2
presented an occasion for the Supreme Court to show and to consider the tension between a city's conflicting goals of preventing
the concentration of theaters showing sexually explicit, nonobscene movies and protecting First Amendment rights of expression.15 3 This tension became apparent in the case as a result of
Detroit's adoption of a zoning ordinance requiring the geographic
dispersement of "adult" movie theaters. Specifically, the ordinance provided that an adult theater could not be located within
one thousand feet of any two other adult theaters or "regulated
uses," which included ten additional kinds of establishments, or
within five hundred feet of a residential area. I" 4 The ordinance
classified a theater as "adult" based expressly upon the character
of the films it showed. 15 5 Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens
first noted that whether speech is or is not protected by the First
Amendment is entirely dependent on the content of the
speech.156 He also noted that even within the contours of protected speech, "a difference in content may require a different
governmental response,''157 as in the case of defamation, where a
different result obtains depending on whether the defamatory
content involves a public figure or a private figure.15 8 Finally, Justice Stevens observed that distinctions based upon content exist in
commercial speech and obscenity cases.' 5 9
150. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion).
151. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Defamation and the speech of
public employees also fit within the rubric of low value speech. See TRIBE, supra note 3,
§ 12-18, at 930 & nn.14-15.
152. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
153. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976). No claim was

asserted that the ordinance reached only unprotected obscenity. See id. at 61-62.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 53.
156. id. at 66 (discussing content as the key to drawing the line between permissible
advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime, between nonfighting words and fighting
words, and between permissible news stories and impermissible disclosures of confidential
governmental information).
The plurality in American Mini-Theatresquibbled about how properly to characterize
the Detroit zoning ordinance. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Burger, White, and
Rehnquist, expressly recognized that the ordinance in question was not content-neutral.

See id. at 70-71. Justice Powell, who provided the fifth vote for the plurality in his
concurring opinion, disagreed with this characterization, and concluded that the ordinance,
in fact, was content-neutral. See id. at 78-79. Thus, without accepting Justice Stevens' view

that the zoning ordinance was not content-neutral, Justice Powell agreed to the slidingscale balancing approach. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart, and
three others, argued in dissent that the zoning ordinance was constitutionally impermissible
because it was a content-based restriction. See id. at 84-86.

157. Id.
158. Id. at 66-67.
159. Id. at 68-69 (discussing cases affording commercial speech some protection and
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Reasoning that lines drawn on the basis of content do not necessarily violate the government's "paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication,"16 the

plurality found two justifications for the ordinance's content-based
distinctions. First, the effect of the ordinance on all films was the

same; the ordinance did not approve or disapprove of films based
upon their points of view. 16 1 Second, sexually-explicit but nonob-

scene expression "is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude"
or value than other forms of speech, particularly "untrammeled
political debate.' 1 6 2 Against this backdrop, the plurality then bal-

anced the slight First Amendment value of sexually-explicit, nonobscene speech against the city's interest in preserving the

character of its neighborhoods, and concluded 6that
the city's inter3
est outweighed the value of such expression.'
The sliding-scale balancing approach of American Mini Theatres has not amounted to an "aberration," as hoped for by the dissenters. 16 4 Instead, it has become a distinct doctrinal approach,
one that allows states and municipalities sufficient room and "reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly
serious problems.' 1 6 5 In the contexts in which it has been
employed, 6 6 the First Amendment interests arguably have been
relatively weak vis-a-vis the harms sought to be redressed by the
governmental unit, 6 7 and application of traditional, absolutist

prohibiting the distribution and exhibition of nonobscene adult materials to juveniles, and
concluding that the cases turned on the content of the communication under
consideration).
160. Id. at 70.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71.
164. See id. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 71.
166. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Osborne v Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, __, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1696-97 (1990)
(upholding state law proscribing the possession and viewing of child pornography after
balancing First Amendment values and the state's governmental interest in safeguarding
the health and safety of children); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 4855 (1986) (upholding city zoning ordinance restricting the location of "adult" movie
theaters after balancing First Amendment values and the city's substantial governmental
interests in preserving the quality of urban life and eliminating the "secondary effects" of
adult theaters on the character of neighborhoods); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 75664 (1982) (upholding state law proscribing the knowing distribution of child pornography
after balancing First Amendment values and the state's governmental interest in
preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (a restriction on truthful
commercial speech is permissible if it "directly advances the [substantial] governmental
interest asserted ... and is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest");
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744- 50 (1978) (plurality opinion) (upholding the
power of government to restrict the public broadcast of indecent language after balancing
First Amendment values and the state's governmental interest in protecting unwilling
listeners and the well-being of children).
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rules (either it is or is not protected speech) would have stymied or
even disabled the government in its problem-solving efforts.16 In
short, while the "low value" approach may be problematic in
terms of line drawing and slippery slopes, 169 its virtue is the balancing of competing values that it permits.
Just as the Court has rethought commercial speech jurisprudence and identified commercial speech as an intermediate category of speech entitled to less than full constitutional
protection,1 70 hate speech, to the extent that it currently is
thought to be fully protected, should be reconsidered and identified as an intermediate category of speech.' 7 1 In identifying
168. See Note, supra note 86, at 242 ("Although the two-tier approach works well when
[F]irst [A]mendment interests are particularly weak or strong, it seems unsatisfactory when,
as in the regulation of the possession of child pornography, the [F]irst [A]mendment
interests enjoy some intermediate value."); see also Recent Cases, FirstAmendment-Racist
and Sexist Expression on Campus-Court Strikes Down University Limits on Hate SpeechDoe v. University of Michigan, 721 F Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989), 103 HAHV. L. REV. 1397,
1397, 1399 (1990) (two-tier analysis--"categorization analysis"-maximizes important First
Amendment interests but undervalues conflicting norms and, very possibly, perpetuates
problems sought to be redressed; indeed, "the analytical technique 'predetermine[s]'
rulings against restrictions by defining a tight sphere of unprotected speech and ruling out
consideration of competing interests") (footnote omitted).
169. See TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-18, at 940-44 (critique of low value approach);
Prygoski, supra note 145, at 319, 351-53 (same).
170. Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial speech is
outside the protection of the First Amendment) with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech is
entitled to some First Amendment protection) and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978) (while commercial speech is entitled to a degree of constitutional protection, it
has a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values").
In American Mini Theatres the Court utilized a sliding-scale balancing approach even
though the plurality could not agree on whether the zoning ordinance was or was not
content-neutral. See supra note 156. In the commercial speech area, by way of contrast,
the Court has not struggled with the characterization problem: The majorities in the
commercial speech cases have agreed that the level of protection to be accorded a
particular type of commercial speech is entirely dependent upon its content. See, e.g.,
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (majority states that a lawyer's inperson solicitation of a client involves commercial speech that, because of its content,
"lowers the level of appropriate judicial scrutiny"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (majority states that "[ilf
there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection,.., it must
be distinguished by its content."). The point is that the majorities in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy and Ohralik employed the sliding-scale balancing approach even though in both
cases they conceded that the degree of scrutiny and the level of protection to be accorded
the speech at issue was to be determined solely by the content of the speech. The
commercial speech cases, therefore, provide a stronger argument for the sliding-scale
balancing approach.
171. The idea here is that with the advent of the low value speech approach,
reclassification of speech is a viable option under certain circumstances. In the case of
commercial speech, the Court extended some First Amendment protection to speech that
previously was without protection. In large part, the Court's reclassification was prompted
by recognition that in a predominantly free market economy, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable to the informed consumer. See Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65. But there is no requirement that reclassification involve a
"ratchet-up" in the degree of constitutional protection. To the contrary. Substantial
governmental interests may call for restrictions on some forms of borderline speech so that
other objectives may be achieved.
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speech of low value, four factors have appeared in the Court's
analysis: the proximity of the speech to central First Amendment
concerns; the speaker's purpose and intent; the degree to which
the speech has noncognitive aspects, to which the Constitution
accords less protection; and the likelihood that the statute regulating the speech was passed for constitutionally infirm motivations
or the likelihood17 2that the statute will generate constitutionally
worrisome evils.
Taking into account these factors, abusive speech within the
school environment surely constitutes "low value" speech. Discriminatory slurs aimed at students are not related to affairs of the
public and do not further endeavors to ascertain truth, nor do they
encourage open discussion of ideas and issues of import.17 3 Hate
speech thus does not enjoy a closeness to primary First Amendment concerns. Moreover, the speaker of epithets and slurs does
not seek to communicate any message, but rather intends to inflict
harm on a victim 174 who, because of age and past experiences, is
particularly vulnerable. With respect to the third factor, hate
speech intended to injure is overwhelmingly noncognitive; the
speaker does not impart knowledge in any way. Whether the regulation of hate speech is based on constitutionally permissible reasons and legitimate motivations is a closer question, for opponents
of regulation will assert the problem of content- or viewpointbased discrimination. 175 The claim is insufficient to preclude classification of hate speech as "low value" expression, however. Justification for regulation is the elimination of a specific harm to
students, and any incidental suppression of particular opinions or
subject matters is tightly connected to the goal of eliminating specific harms. Regulation of "low value" speech, by definition,
involves some modicum of control over expression that does not
place "high" in the First Amendment hierarchy. 176 It is precisely
for this reason that the Supreme Court has upheld narrowlydrafted provisions supported by substantial state interests,
such as
1 77
the reduction or elimination of some perceived harm.
172. See Sunstein, supra note 145, at 602-05.
173. See supra note 68.
174. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
175. See Kingsly Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959) (holding
that the prohibition of the showing of a movie based on Lady Chatterly's Lover was
unconstitutional because of its viewpoint discrimination); American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc.
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that Indianapolis' anti-pornography
statute impermissibly discriminated on the basis of viewpoint).
176. The conceptual notion of "low value" speech turns on "a judgment about its
substantive message." GREENAWALT, supra note 8, at 299. This is undeniable.
177. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 340-46
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Two decisions provide particularly strong support for regulations of hate speech aimed at protecting students. In New York v.
7 ' and Osborne v. Ohio 179
Ferber1
the Court reemphasized the

critical importance of youth and their welfare and well-being. In
upholding a narrowly-tailored prohibition on the distribution of

nonobscene child pornography in Ferber, the Court held the
state's interest in safeguarding the psychological health of minors
to be compelling. 8 0° In Osborne the Court similarly chose to protect the psychological health of young adults, even though to do so
required sustaining a limitation on the First Amendment interest
in possessing nonobscene child pornography.1 8 The prevention
of psychological harm to students resulting from abusive speech is

a compelling governmental interest under Ferber and Osborne
and tips the balance in favor of the constitutionality of school hate
82
speech regulations. 1

(1986) (holding that the greater power to ban gambling altogether includes the lesser power
to prohibit some, but not all, gambling casino advertising); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 744-50 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that the government may restrict the
broadcast of indecent language). See generally Sunstein, supra note 145, at 609-17
(discussing problem of viewpoint discrimination in the context of low value speech and
concluding that it does not necessarily defeat a regulation of low value speech).
178. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
179. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
180. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-64 (1982). The Court stated that "[tihe
legislative judgment, as well as the judgment found in the relevant literature, is that the use
of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the psychological, emotional,
and mental health of the child. That judgment, we think, easily passes muster under the
First Amendment." Id. at 758 (footnote omitted). In so stating, the Court observed that in
the past it had sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional wellbeing of minors, even though the restrictions at issue "operated in the sensitive area of
constitutionally protected [First Amendment] rights." Id. at 757 (citing Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944)). On this basis, the Court upheld what it acknowledged to be a "contentbased classification of speech.., because it may be appropriately generalized that within
the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case
adjudication is required." Id. at 763-64.
181. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, -, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1696-97 (1990).
182. One commentator forcefully has stated this conclusion in analyzing the
ramifications of Osborne:
[I]t is difficult to distinguish the compelling interest in protecting children from
the psychological harm caused by knowledge of future distribution of
pornography from the interest in preventing racial prejudice or other types of
emotional harm to children. For example, protecting children from the
psychological harm inflicted by hate speech might now sustain a content-based
restriction on the right of some groups to express their views when children
might be exposed.
Note, supra note 86, at 242; see also id. at 246 (the low value approach may result in "judicial reclassification of other types of speech, such as vulgar or hate speech").
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3) A "Full Value" Speech Approach: Compelling State
Interests
In order for a discriminatory exclusion of speech to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, its proponent must show that it furthers "a
compelling state interest."'18 3 A third regulatory rationale holds
that proscriptions on hate speech serve compelling governmental
interests. Ferber and Osborne, cases fitting within the "low
value," sliding-scale speech rubric,"8 4 established that the prevention of psychological harm to young people is a compelling state
interest.18 5 That determination has applicability within the "full
value" analytic framework, under which content-based prohibitions must fall unless supported by a compelling justification. The
injurious psychological impact of derogatory epithets and slurs on
individuals, especially children and young adults, is well-documented and widely accepted.' 8 6 Simply stated, the prevention of
psychic injury to students is a compelling interest that outweighs
any right of expression.
Another interest that may be characterized as compelling is a
school's interest in complying with constitutional obligations
imposed on it.'8 7 In accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, 8 8 public colleges and universities are under constitutional mandate to provide equal
educational opportunities for students.' 9 Abusive speech in the
school environment affects students in negative ways and inhibits
their ability to learn, thereby depriving them of opportunities for
full and rich learning experiences. Schools cannot fulfill goals of
equality and equal opportunity when abusive speech prevents students from fully participating in the educational program.' 9 0 Both
the Stanford and the University of Wisconsin regulations are pre183. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); Consolidated Edison v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); see also TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-8, at 833.
184. See supra notes 144-82 and accompanying text.
185. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1696; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
756-59 (1982).
186. See supra notes 28-57 and accompanying text.
187. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
189. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954). In no uncertain terms,
the Court in Brown stated that "[i]n these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." Id. at 493 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the
implications of Brown in the hate speech context, see Lawrence, supra note 9, at 438-49
(arguing that Brown is a case about equal educational opportunity and racist speech).
190. See Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 525, 551 (1987); Shapiro, Note, supra note 9, at 228.
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mised, in part, on the compelling governmental interest of provid-

ing equal access to education.'"'
The psychological injury of paramount concern to the Court

in Brown 192 is the type of injury actionable under Title VII 19 a of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964194 and Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972.195 Title VII prohibits discrimination within
the employment setting on the basis of race, sex, religion, or

national origin;' 9 ' Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex within educational institutions receiving federal funding.' 97
Case law under Title VII allows a plaintiff to establish a violation
by showing that discriminatory and harassing conduct created a
hostile or abusive workplace.' 98 The objective of Title VII is to

provide employees with environments "free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult."' 9 9 The determination of
whether a work environment
is hostile includes consideration of
"verbal conduct."'2 0 0 In some instances, therefore, equality interests can trump free speech interests. 20 1 Brown's powerful analysis
191. See FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION, supra note 115, at § 2
(harassment on the basis of sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or
national and ethnic origin "contributes to a hostile environment that makes access to
education for those subjected to it less than equal"); Wisc. ADMIN. CODE, supra note 118, at
§ 17.06(2) (harassment on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry, or age that demeans an individual and creates an
"intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment" is prohibited); see also Hodulik, supra
note 14, at 576-78 (discussing "familiar legal principles" that establish a university's
"general duty to provide equal educational opportunities"). As discussed above, Stanford
and the University of Wisconsin also premised their regulations on the fighting words
doctrine. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
192. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
193. See Brown, Note, supra note 11, at 326.
194. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(e) to 2000(e)-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
195. Pub. L. No. 92-318,86 Stat. 235,373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 16811686 (1988)).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
197. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
198. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
199. Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
200. See id.; EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(aX3) (1988).
Discriminatory epithets and slurs, thus, are cognizable under certain circumstances.
However, the "'mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in an employee' would not affect the conditions of employment to [a] sufficiently
significant degree to violate Title VII." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
201. In a related context, the Court has held that a state's "compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination" justifies any impact that a state's anti-discrimination statute may
have on First Amendment rights of freedom of expressive association. See Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); see also New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481
U.S. 537 (1987). In Roberts the Court held that "even if enforcement of the [state antidiscrimination] Act causes some incidental abridgment of the... [civic group's] protected
speech," by requiring it to admit women members, the incidental abridgment was
permissible because of the "State's strong historical commitment to eliminating
discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access" in public accommodations. Roberts,
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of the psychological effects of harassment and discrimination mesh
analytically with the hostile environment concept, making the
eradication of hostile educational environments a compelling state
interest.2 °2
III.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
REQUIRES REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH

The "no value" speech approach (fighting words), the "low
value" speech approach (variable protection), and the "full value"
speech approach (compelling governmental interests),20 3 all
articulated within the discussion concerning constitutionally legitimate responses to abusive epithets and slurs at the college and university level,204 are viable doctrinal approaches for regulating hate
468 U.S. at 624, 628. In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the stigmatization
and the deprivations of personal dignity suffered by women when they are denied
membership in organizations solely on account of their sex. See id.at 624-27. Roberts and
Title VII's prohibition on hostile environments results from the explicit recognition of
sensibility harms and stands for the proposition that equality values can outweigh free
speech values. See Note, supra note 43, at 698-700; Recent Cases, supra note 168, at 1401
n.43.
202. Cf Smith v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 316 F. Supp. 1174, 1176-77 (E.D. La.
1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (prohibiting under Brown the display
of the Confederate flag in a high school). As one commentator has argued:
Hostile environment analysis under Title VII and Title IX demonstrates that
speakers are free to utter words and phrases of their choice, no matter how
abhorrent to listeners, until those utterances go beyond mere verbalization and
create a hostile environment. Universities should borrow this hostile
environment concept to draft constitutional campus conduct codes.
Shapiro, Note, supra note 9, at 226; see also Recent Cases, supra note 168, at 1401 n.43. For
a detailed discussion of the hostile environment concept, see Shapiro, Note, supra note 9, at
220-29.
Professor Strossen has objected that Brown does not provide a useful analogy, because
that case involved government speech, not speech by private individuals. See Strossen,
supra note 15, at 541-42, 544-47. Her state action doctrine objection is well-taken, but it
probably does not disqualify the anti-discrimination message of Brown or the hostile environment analogy as bases for the regulation of hate speech, for no court has held Title VII to
be an impermissible regulation of a private person's speech rights. See Lawrence, supra
note 9, at 440 n.41. Moreover, Justice O'Connor has stated: "It is beyond dispute that any
public entity, state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars,
drawn from the tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private
prejudice." J.A. Crosen Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 720 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
203. See supra notes 88-202 and accompanying text.
204. Only two university regulations have been held unconstitutional. See UWM, Inc.
v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F.
Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In Doe the court, on the grounds of overbreadth and
vagueness, invalidated the University of Michigan's hate speech regulation, which made
sanctionable speech that stigmatized or victimized students on the basis of enumerated
traits, constituted a threat, interfered with their academic efforts or participation in school
activities, and created an "intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment." See id. at
856, 866-67. Similarly, the court in UWM Post invalidated the University of Wisconsin's
hate speech regulation on the grounds of overbreadth and vagueness. See UWM Post, 774
F. Supp. at 1181. Thus, there are no guarantees that courts will determine hate speech
regulations, whatever their regulatory rationale, to be constitutionally valid. On the other
hand, however, by narrowly drafting regulations in accordance with clear First
Amendment doctrine permitting limited control of speech, colleges and universities seek to
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speech at the elementary and secondary levels as well.20 5 Expres-

sion that is unprotected for adults certainly is unprotected for children in the public schools. Doctrinal approaches considered and
utilized at the level of post-secondary education thus establish a
beginning point for considering ways to deal with abusive speech

in the public schools and for thinking about how the tension
between the values of equality and free speech affects elementary
and secondary students and the educational enterprise itself. Specific constitutional doctrine carved out by the Supreme Court to
govern the operation of the public schools provides additional support for speech-limiting regulations designed not to ratify bald acts
of administrative censorship, but rather to advance principles of
equality in a way consistent with First Amendment principles.

Furthermore, normative educational values of democratic educational theory applicable to elementary and secondary schools suggest that good educational policy requires the regulation of hate
speech in the public schools.
A.

NORMATIVE EDUCATIONAL VALUES OF DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATIONAL THEORY MANDATE REGULATION OF
HATE SPEECH

Public education, like society and post-secondary education
except on a smaller scale, is a philosophical puzzle; it simultaneously reflects libertarian and communitarian ideals 2 0 6 and grapples
with both visions in attempting to fulfill its mission, however
defined.20 7 Education is marked by a struggle for conceptual and
implement rules that are fully sustainable under the Constitution. See, e.g., Grey, supra
note 15, at 54 (The Stanford proposal "is consistent with First Amendment principles as the
courts have developed them. However no court has ruled on the constitutionality of a
harassment restriction based on the 'fighting words' concept, and no one can guarantee that
this approach will prove acceptable. What in my view is virtually certain is that any
broader approach... will be found by courts applying current case law to be invalid.").
205. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
206. See Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy".
Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15, 17-18, 94-95 ("[Public]
[s]chools are asked simultaneously to respect and nurture both the communal and
individual aspects of the human spirit."); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L.
REv. 565, 647 (1980) ("Children are the Achilles heel of liberal ideology.").
207. Concisely stated, the public schools have four broad areas of goals that frame their
educational function: "(1) academic, embracing all intellectual skills and domains of
knowledge; (2) vocational, geared to developing readiness for productive work and
economic responsibility; (3) social and civic, related to preparing for socialization into a
complex society; and (4) personal, emphasizing the development of individual
responsibility, talent, and free expression." GOODLAD,supra note 22, at 37; see also id. at
50-56. One commentator has stated the goals of education in even broader terms:
"Education may aim to perfect human nature by developing its potentialities, to deflect it
into serving socially useful purposes, or to defeat it by repressing those inclinations that are
socially destructive." GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 22 (footnote omitted).
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normative clarity of purpose:
There is a profound confusion in America today

about the school's role in shaping character. A corrosive
individualism eats away at the heart of the enterprise.
Teachers are doubtful about the grounds of their moral
authority, parents organize themselves into special-interest groups, students are trained to become skillful consumers and clever advocates. We are uncertain how to
*o8
give form to... our program for social survival ....

The struggle is not one limited to consideration and debate by professional educators and concerned parents, at a level removed
from the students themselves: oftentimes, students can "clearly
articulate the tenuous balance between individual expression and
collective responsibility.- 20 9 Nonetheless, so long as First Amendment doctrine is thought to be derived from principles of liberalism and the belief in the self-sufficient and autonomous
individual, value training and community concerns will conflict
with free speech.2 1 0 Notwithstanding this tension, however, educational authorities have concluded that the good school is one
that has a rich sense of community,2 1 1 that is, a "sharing of atti-

beliefs that bond disparate individuals into a
tudes, values, and
2
community.

21

Principled decision making intended to result in good
schools-schools possessing a strong feeling of community and a
positive ethos--presupposes a normative theory of education,21 3
208. GRANT, supra note 12, at 1.

209.

SARA

LAWRENCE LIGHTFOOT, THE GOOD

HIGH

SCHOOL:

PORTRAITS

OF

347 (1983).
210. See Ingber, supra note 206, at 18, 66.
211. See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 12, at 1 (school is a community); see also LIGHTFOOT,
supra note 209, at 346 ("[A]dministrators, teachers, and students combine to form a
CHARACTER AND CULTURE

community [in countless ways]. Both adults and adolescents seem to need to feel a part of a
larger network of relationships and want to feel identified with and protected by a caring
institution.").
212. GRANT, supra note 12, at 117; see also LIGHTFOOT, supra note 209, at 321, 323,

346 (good schools offer protection and solace by "separat[ingj the school from the wider
society, marking internal and external territories," and offering institutional values).
213. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 6. Professor Gutmann has argued that
educational policy prescriptions cannot be evaluated without first thinking through and
adopting a political theory about education:
All significant policy prescriptions presuppose a theory, a political theory, of
the proper role of government in education. When the theory remains implicit,
we cannot adequately judge its principles or the policy prescriptions that flow
from them. The attractions of avoiding theory are ... superficial. We do not
collectively know good educational policy when we see it; we cannot make good
educational policy by avoiding political controversy; nor can we make principled
educational policy without exposing our principles and investigating their
implications.
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ideally one that "avoid[s] both the extreme pessimism of many
voices on the left and the brittle moral formulas often advanced by
those on the right.

214

A useful theory fulfills two functions: it

gives content to what society's educational objectives ought to be,
and it specifies who is responsible for educational policy. 21 5 A

democratic theory of education for the public schools satisfies both
requirements, providing a basis for normative discourse on goals,
in addition to establishing who has authority to make decisions and
to shape education and schooling.216
The conceptual foundation of a democratic theory of education is democracy itself. Proponents believe that authority over
elementary and secondary educational matters should be distributed among parents, professional educators, and the public, with
the collective will of the majority controlling educational
choices.217 So long as there is no single conception of the good life,
Id. Moreover, we can choose among and give content to the aims of schools "only by developing a normative theory of what the educational purposes of our society should be." Id. at
22; see also Lawrence Kohlberg & Rochelle Mayer, Development as the Aim of Education,
42 HARV. EDuc. REV. 449, 449 (1972) ("Without clear and rational educational goals, it
becomes impossible to decide which educational programs achieve objectives of general
import and which teach incidental facts and attitudes of dubious worth.").
214. GRANT, supra note 12, at 1. The literature on education is replete with doomsday
assessments of American schooling. See, e.g., JAMES SAMUEL COLEMAN, REPORT ON
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1966) (education in
schools makes little or no difference in the distribution of income, work, and intelligence
among students, and does not assist students in overcoming disadvantages arising from their
family backgrounds). Professor Lightfoot has responded as follows:
The combined impact of the subtle negativisms of social science
investigations and the flagrant attacks of muckrakers over the last few decades
has produced a cultural attitude towards schools which assumes their
inadequacies and denies evidence of goodness. This pessimism and cynicism has
had a peculiarly American cast. The persistent complaints seem to reflect a
powerful combination of romanticism, nostalgia, and feelings of loss for a simpler
time when values were clear; when children were well behaved; when family
and schools agreed on educational values and priorities; when the themes of
honor, respect, and loyalty directed human interaction. In comparison to this
idealized retrospective view, the contemporary realities of school seem nothing
short of catastrophic.
LIGHTFOOT, supra note 209, at 314 (footnote omitted). The overtly negative appraisals of
schools also may result from the high standards of evaluation employed. Id. at 309. The
establishment of good schools will be nearly impossible if the standard is perfection or
something close to perfection. Id.
215. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 6-7, 11, 16, 22.
216. See id. at 6-9, 41-47.
217. See ANN BASTIAN ET AL., CHOOSING EQUALITY: THE CASE FOR DEMOCRATIC

("democratic concepts of schooling should govern," with the
"empowerment" of parents, teachers, and communities an absolute necessity); GRANT,
supra note 12, at 4 (a successful educational venture requires "a dialogue with all members
of the polity-students, parents, teachers, and staff"; the public school "must be in dialogue
with its public about the nature of both the moral and the intellectual life of the school");
GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 11, 42 (parents, professional educators, and citizens must be
".empowered" to make educational policy). For purposes of discussion, this article focuses
on the democratic educational theory outlined by Professor Gutmann. See GUTMANN,
supra note 25. Unlike many educational philosophies or idealogies, her theory is
SCHOOLING 5-6, 92-133 (1986)
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there can be no single ideal of moral education. 2 1

Disagreements

over the aims of education and the appropriate solutions to partic219
ular educational issues are inevitable in a pluralistic society.
Thus, democratic deliberation on educational problems and on
school management as a means to achieving public reconciliation
of differences, according to Professor Gutmann, is the distinctive
virtue of a democratic theory of education.220 The deliberative
process will not result in the selection of the right courses of action
or the wisest choices all of the time, but it will produce educational
policy informed by the values and concerns of the community.2 2 '
Drawing upon the theoretical strengths of the normative educational philosophies advanced by three political thinkers, Professor Gutmann's theory of democratic education has multiple
rationales. A democratic theory of education holds that virtue
should be taught to students, but not based upon the conception of
the Platonic family state, pursuant to which the state, as the sole
entity vested with control over educational matters, forces the cultivation of unity by teaching what it alone has defined to be the
moral ideal or the singular conception of the good life. 2 The thenonfoundationalist in that it is not tied to any conceptions about human nature or its
development. See id. at 21-22. For general discussions of educational ideologies linked to
particular assumptions about psychological development, see JOHN M. RICH & JOSEPH L.
DEvrrIs, THEORIES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1985); Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 213,
at 451-59.
218. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 11-12.
219. Individuals have their own ideas and standards regarding child-rearing and the
development of effective schools, standards not amenable to simple translation into public
policy. According to Professor Gutmann, "[t]here is no way to achieve social agreement on
a moral ideal of education, at least in our lifetimes." Id. at 12.
220. See id. at 11-12. For some theorists, in contrast, democratic deliberation and
control over education is the root cause of the serious problems in many school systems and
the cause of infringement of individual rights and liberties. See, e.g., STEPHEN ARONS,
COMPELLING BELIEF:

THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING (1983) (arguing that

majority control of the public schools is incompatible with First Amendment liberties, stifles
the views of dissenting families, and manipulates political consciousness); JOHN E. CHUBB &
TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990) (arguing that direct
democratic control over schools is the cause of the public schools' failure adequately to
perform and to meet the nation's educational needs); Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence
III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309 (1980) (arguing that majoritarian control of the public schools
undercuts the most basic freedoms of a democratic system); Nadine Strossen, Book Review,
19 J. LAw & EDUC. 147 (1990) (reviewing AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION
(1987)) (arguing that majoritarian decision making undervalues concerns for individual
freedom).
221. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 11, 72, 99. But see Senhauser, Note, supra note
61, at 967 n.161 (questioning the assumption that school boards are representative of
community values because of typically low voter turnout at school board elections, the
disproportionate influence of affluent voters, and the lack of knowledge about educational
concerns characteristic of most members of the community).
222. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 22-28, 46. The Supreme Court has repudiated
the Platonic vision of education. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-12
(1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
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ory of the family state is theoretically weak because it attempts to
preempt the myriad conceptions of the good life, that is, choices
among ways of life, held by parents and citizens.2 2 3 On the other
hand, the Lockean theory of the state of families, under which
educational authority rests exclusively in parents, 4 while recognizing the values of pluralism and of parental freedom to pass on
their own values and ways of life to their children, ignores the reality that parents alone cannot be relied upon to teach their children
the skills essential to rational deliberation, nor can they be relied
upon to teach their children mutual respect.2 2 5 In addition to
authorizing the teaching of virtue, democratic educational theory
thus holds that parental involvement is an essential element in the
formation of educational policy, but that parents cannot have complete control. 22 6 Finally, democratic educational theory rejects
the theory of the state of individuals, which is derived from the
work of John Stuart Mill, pursuant to which the ideal educational
authority maximizes the future choices of children without predisposing them towards any particular conception of the good life.2 27
Under the theory of the state of individuals, schools are to provide
opportunity of choice among conceptions of the good life and, at
the same time, are to remain neutral regarding the varying conceptions of the good life. The objection of democratic educational
theory is that neutrality is a mistaken ideal, one that is unattainable, and that children's choices must be limited to some degree
because some choices, religious intolerance and bigotry, for example, are wrong. 2281
The cultivation of character, under democratic educational
theory, is both legitimate and inevitable. 22 9 By acknowledging
and allowing the cultivation of character, and by purposefully constraining choices to predispose children towards certain values,
however, democratic educational theory shares a weakness present in the theories of the family state and the state of families.23 °
The weakness is the potential for "imposition of a noncritical consciousness on children, '2 3 1 that is, teaching children to accept cer223. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 28.
224. See id. at 28-33.
225. See id. at 29-33.
226. See id. at 46.
227. See id. at 33-35; see also Ingber, supra note 206, at 25-30.
228. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 35-41, 46.
229. See id. at 41, 51-52.
230. See id. at 43-44.
231. Id. at 44. Once inside the classroom, democratic majorities or their
representatives face strong temptations to control what is taught. See id, at 72.
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tain beliefs or a particular conception of the good life suggested to

them in an unthinking, nondeliberative way.23 2 To ensure that
children develop the capacity to consider and to evaluate competing choices and competing formulations of the good life, democratic educational theory has two important limits on parental and

political (democratic) control of education.

33

These limitations

serve to restrict the majoritarian decision making process. 3 4
The first limiting principle is that of "nonrepression," which
"prevents the state, and any group within it, from using education
to restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the

good life and the good society.- 235 Education cannot be utilized to
restrict children's consideration of other ways of life or the "just"
society. The second limiting principle is that of "nondiscrimination," which provides that all educable children must be educated. 3 6 These limiting principles permit parents and other

groups to shape children's choices; at the same time, however,
they prevent any single group from monopolizing collective decision making.2 3 7
The principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination constitute a normative call to cultivate in students the foundational values and principles of democratic society.2 38 The public schools

should teach children concern for civic virtue and mutual respect
for all people, 23 9 regardless of religion, race, sex, or sexual prefer232. See id. at 44. Noncritical consciousness would allow children to accept, without
evaluation, sexist values, for example. See id. According to Professor Gutmann, such a
result would be undemocratic because of the failure "to secure any space for educating
children to deliberate critically among a range of good lives and good societies." Id.
233. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 44.
234. The theoretical danger of all overbearing majorities is their undervaluation of
concerns for the rules of justice and the rights of the minority party. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
235. GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 44.
236. See id. at 45. The second principle is one of nonexclusion: "No educable child
may be excluded from an education adequate to participating in the political processes that
structure choice among good lives." id.
237. See id. at 46.
238. See id. at 19, 72; ROBERT D. HESLEP, EDUCATION IN DEMOCRACY:

EDUCATION'S

MORAL ROLE IN THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 4 (1989) ("Even though the United States has
some features commonly thought to be undemocratic, it has many important ones-such as
its ideals of liberty, equality, and representative government-that constitute it by and
large as a democratic state, albeit an imperfect one."). Several commentators, however,
have argued that whether foundational values and principles can be articulated at all is an
open question. See, e.g., Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political
Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1134 (1979) (there are no "uniformly
acceptable" political values); Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on
Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REV. 197, 204 n.24 (1983)
("Whether or not there is such a thing as 'common values,' or 'basic values,' or an American
creed is a hypothesis that has yet to be clearly confirmed.").
239. See GUTMANN, supra note 25, at 33, 42, 44, 72.
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ence.2 4 ° As a prescriptive matter, democratic educational theory

views social diversity as desirable because of the enrichment it
provides in terms of expanding perceptions and understandings of
differing ways of life and differing points of view.2 4 1 For these reasons, when "children come to school believing that 'blacks, Jews,
Catholics, and/or homosexuals are inferior beings who shouldn't
have the same rights as the rest of us,' . . . it is criticism, not just

clarification, of children's values that is needed."'242 The normative values of democratic educational theory, therefore, mandate
strong criticism of racist, sexist, and homophobic speech, as well as
speech reflecting intolerant attitudes towards religious and ethnic

groups. Proscriptions on the usage of abusive language make clear
the school's disavowal of the value judgments behind such utter-

ances and further the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination by

ensuring

respect

for

the

dignity of individual

students. 43
B.

SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE GOVERNING THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS PERMITS THE REGULATION OF
HATE SPEECH

1) The Supreme Court, Democratic Education, and Value
Inculcation
The present structure of control over public education is
marked by the dispersal of authority among parents, professional
educators, and the public.2 4 4 A central feature of the public school
240. See id. at 29-30, 40, 44, 56, 72, 122, 287.

241. See id. at 33.
242. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
243. To fail to proscribe abusive epithets and slurs within the public schools in some
way is to indicate agreement with them: "[A]dults [within the school community]
epitomize some version of character to pupils-by ignoring or responding to incidents of
racism in the classroom and hallway.... by the agreements they make about what behavior
will not be tolerated as well as what actions will be honored." GRANT, supra note 12, at 1;

accord Rosemary C. Salomone, From Widmar to Mergens: The Winding Road of First
Amendment Analysis, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 319 (1991) ("Any form of expression
exercised by anyone within the public schools runs the risk of appearing to be endorsed by
government officials."). But see Board of Education v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2372 (1990)
(plurality opinion) ("We think that secondary school students are mature enough and are
likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely
permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.").
244. See ARONS,supra note 220, at viii ("a large part of the child-rearing function is
handed over to a politically controlled, majority-oriented, and bureaucratically organized
system of schools"); David A. Diamond, The FirstAmendment and PublicSchools: The Case
AgainstJudicialIntervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477, 506 (1981) ("The structure of education
in the United States is predominantly local."); see also Shiffrin, supra note 206, at 653 ("[A]
system which fragments decisionmaking about educational control is more likely to further
children's rights. Granting absolute authority over what a second grader will learn to one
parent, one school board, or one teacher is both unnecessary and undesirable.").
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system, thus, in fact, is democratic control of education, the very
hallmark of democratic educational theory. By and large, the
Supreme Court has recognized and endorsed democratic educational theory in establishing the parameters of First Amendment

doctrine for the public schools.2 45 The Court has been reluctant to
interfere with the local resolution of educational disputes, 24 6 and
instead "has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials.., to
'247
prescribe and control conduct in the schools."
The comprehensive authority of state legislatures and local
school boards is premised on the proposition that the popular elec-

tion of representatives results in the translation of parental and
community values into educational policy. 248 In ceding authority
over the public schools to parents, professional educators, and citizens via the political process, the Court has acknowledged and
accepted value inculcation as an inevitable and wholly legitimate
function of the public schools.2 4 9 Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v.
245. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlneier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) ("[O]ur oftexpressed view [is] that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of

parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges") (citations
omitted); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The determination
of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate rests with
the school board."); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 860-65 (1982) (states and local school boards have broad authority to manage
school affairs and must discharge "highly discretionary functions"); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 326 (1975) ("The system of public education that has evolved in this Nation relies
necessarily upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board
members ....

"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973)

(recognizing "the merit of local [school] control"); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (school boards have "important, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (states have substantial power over
education, including the power to compel school attendance, make reasonable regulations
governing the operation of schools, and establish curriculum requirements).
246. See Richard L. Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of
Schooling in America, 40 HARV. EDUC. REV. 567, 568 (1970) ("Judicial diffidence towards
local school matters reflects the traditional American belief that education is a local concern
which should be shaped and supervised by local officials."); Robert B. Keiter, Judicial
Review of Student First Amendment Claims: Assessing the Legitimacy-Competency
Debate, 50 Mo. L. REV. 25, 26 (1985) ('The Court has consistently expressed the view that
state and local officials are primarily responsible for educational matters, and that courts
generally should defer to their decisions.") (footnote omitted); Senhauser, Note, supra note
61, at 967 n.161 ("Traditionally, the Court has been hesitant to intervene in educational
disputes because it viewed the educational process as a local matter.").
247. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
248. See Diamond, supra note 244, at 494 n.86.
249. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (the public schools are "'a most
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government"' and
serve "as the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society rests' ")
(citations omitted); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-80 (1979) (the public schools
prepare young people for citizen participation in the future and preserve cultural values);
Pico, 457 U.S. at 864-65 (the public schools are vitally important as vehicles for inculcating
fundamental values necessary to a democratic political system); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (the public schools must teach subjects "plainly essential to good
citizenship"); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 ("[T]he state may do much, go very far, indeed, in
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Fraser and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court's
most recent pronouncements on the First Amendment constraints
on the public schools, expressed the Court's view that teaching students about community values and the principles of our society is
vital to their social and moral development and to the maintenance of our political system.250
The Court's acceptance of value inculcation and programs of
moral education in the public schools, however, is not unconditional or without limits. Democratic control of schools that choose
to ride roughshod over basic, individual rights and freedoms of

students would be an incongruence intolerable under the Constitution. The Court, therefore, proscribes narrow religious, political,
and moral indoctrination,2 5 1 and attempts to foster homogeneity
in the schools. 2 While value inculcation is permissible, indoctrination is not;25 3 judicial intervention is necessary in the case of the
latter, on the ground that certain constitutional norms are too fun-

damental to leave to the judgment of parents and the local school
board.254
The line between permissible value inculcation and impermissible indoctrination may not be as sharp as we would prefer. Nevertheless, encouraging students to embrace certain moral norms

and ideals based upon principles essential to civilized society
clearly falls on the side of constitutionally permissible value inculorder to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally .... ). Central
to Brown was the Court's understanding that education is the primary vehicle for exposing
students to cultural values. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
250. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-84
(1986). "Fraserwas the first recent education law decision to explicate and uphold a school
board's values mission. The fact that the decision reflected a near-unanimous agreement of
the Court's liberal and conservative wings-and that its value inculcating themes were
reiterated in the recent Hazelwood decision-adds to its significance." PUBLIC VALUES,
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 45 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989) (footnotes omitted). These two decisions
indicate that at least a majority of the present Court is comfortable with the inculcative
function of public education. For discussions of the public schools and the transmission of
society's collective values, see Diamond, supra note 244, at 496-510; Brian A. Freeman, The
Supreme Court and FirstAmendment Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A
Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 4-20 (1984); Ingber, supra note
206, at 20-30; Keiter, supra note 246, at 48-55; Levin, supra note 60, at 1647-61; Senhauser,
Note, supra note 61, at 943-45, 959-77. For the view that the inculcative model is
inappropriate and inconsistent with the personal autonomy of students, see van Geel, supra
note 238, at 252-53.
251. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 864-72; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507-14; Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-09 (1968); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430, 436 (1962); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
252. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
253. See generally Freeman, supra note 250, at 50-57; Keiter, supra note 246, at 55-60.
254. See Keiter, supra note 246, at 58. In effect, judicial intervention interrupts the
majoritarian political process. See id.
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cation. 5 5 Teaching the constitutional values of equality and freedom from discrimination, along with the derivative value of
mutual respect for all people, fosters pluralism and is far removed
from the narrow political, religious, and moral indoctrination that
the Supreme Court has repudiated.
2)

Public School Students and the FirstAmendment:

Tinker, Fraser,and Kuhlmeier
Children and teenagers-precollege students-have constitutional rights.25 6 In general, however, their rights never have been
held by the Supreme Court to be coextensive with the constitutional rights of adults.2 57 The Court has justified limitations based
upon the unique situation of children vis-a-vis their parents and
the state and a recognition of the developmental characteristics of
children. The Court has articulated three specific reasons supporting differential constitutional treatment of children: "the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions

in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.12 5 These same concerns have allowed
the Court to conclude that the First Amendment rights of children
are not as broad as those enjoyed by adults, and that states may
limit the free speech rights of children to a greater extent than
they permissibly may limit the free speech rights of adults. 2 59
255. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text. Teaching students about
appropriate moral standards can be saved from indoctrination largely by the manner in
which it takes place. See GRANT, supra note 12, at 192-93; Freeman, supra note 250, at 55.
"If adults teach ... [moral standards and ideals] in an authoritarian manner as a fixed and
unvarying code that must be stamped into the consciousness of children, then they can be
charged with indoctrination." GRANT, supra note 12, at 193. As the Supreme Court has
stated: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Barnette,
319 U.S. at 642; cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). On the other hand, if teachers
offer arguments and reasons for the standards and ideals to persuade students to accept and
to uphold them, they cannot be charged with indoctrination. See BERNARD MURCHLAND,
VOICES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 31-32 (1990) (reporting comments of Derek Bok on
schools and indoctrination); GRANT, supra note 12, at 193.
256. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-31 (1966).
257. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (plurality opinion); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
258. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. In the Court's view, states may limit the freedom of
children to make decisions because "during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Id. at 635 (footnote omitted). In other
words, as a result of children's incapacity for fully rational deliberation, their personal
autonomy is not critical. See Ingber, supra note 206, at 18.
259. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266-67; Fraser,478 U.S. at 682-83; Pacifica, 438
U.S. at 749-51; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37, 639-40 (1968); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-71 (1944). For discussions of the relationships between
children, the First Amendment, and the purposes of the First Amendment, see Diamond,
supra note 244, at 487-96; Freeman, supra note 250, at 24-31; John H. Garvey, Children
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The Court's rulings in a series of cases exemplify its solicitude
for children and their less developed capacity to make decisions.
In Prince v. Massachusetts26o the Court upheld the conviction of a
mother who allowed her young sons and her nine-year-old niece to
sell religious materials on city sidewalks in contravention of Massa-

chusetts' comprehensive child labor law. 261 The Court held, over
the parents' objections based upon the Free Exercise Clause and
the general rights of parenthood, that the state possessed an overriding, primary interest in safeguarding the welfare of children,
which interest was broad enough to encompass a concern for both
children's psychological health and their physical well-being.2 6 2

In Ginsbergv. New York

263

the Court similarly acknowledged

the incapacity of children to engage in rational decision making.

In weighing the well-established authority of parents to raise their
own children 2 '

and the interest of the state in protecting chil-

dren,265 the Court noted that "even where there is an invasion of
protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct
of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults."' ,2 66 On this basis, the Court upheld New York's criminal
obscenity statute prohibiting the sale to children under the age of

seventeen of materials deemed to be obscene to children but not
necessarily to adults.267
and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321,333-51(1979); Keiter, supra note 246, at 3144.
260. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
261. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159-62, 170 (1944). In so holding, the Court
stated in no uncertain terms that "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is broader
than over like actions of adults." Id. at 168.
262. See id. at 169-70. According to one commentator, Prince "is a clear recognition of
the principle that parental rights and First Amendment freedoms must sometimes give way
to a regulation of the conduct of children, even though the regulation imposes incidental
burdens on personal liberties." Freeman, supra note 250, at 25-26.
263. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
264. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
265. See id. at 640.
266. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). The Court
noted:
The world of children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression.
The factor of immaturity, and perhaps other considerations, impose different
rules. Without attempting here to formulate the principles relevant to freedom
of expression for children, it suffices to say that regulations of communication
addressed to them need not conform to the requirements of the [F]irst
[A]mendment in the same way as those applicable to adults.
Id. at 638 n.6 (quoting Thomas J. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963)).
267. See id. at 639, 643. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart added the following
insight:
I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely
delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
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The third case in this series is FCC v. PacificaFoundation,26
in which the Court held that the Federal Communications Commission has the power to proscribe the radio broadcast during daytime hours of material that is indecent but not obscene. 269 The
Court's concern, once again, was the government's preeminent
interest in protecting children.2 1 0 Focusing on context, the Court
found that the daytime broadcast of indecent material likely to be
heard by children was "'a right thing in the wrong place.' ",271
Prince, Ginsberg, and Pacifica stand for the proposition that
children may be protected by the state even though the state's
protection would be inappropriate and unconstitutional were the
state to extend it to an adult. At the nub of the Court's analysis is
an assessment of children, their abilities, and their capacities to be
rational actors. This class-based assessment 27 2 is that children are
different from adults.27 3 Thus, their age and maturity are relevant
factors in determining the scope of their rights.
Significantly, to accept that limitations on the rights of children, even the First Amendment rights of children, sometimes are
appropriate does not require acceptance of the notion that children are mere subordinates of adults, to be shaped by currently
prevailing conceptions of human virtue. Nor should it. The idea
here, to borrow a family law concept, is that the best interests of
children2 74 now and then require the imposition of legal restrictions on their freedom to choose. Limitations on their First
Amendment rights, as Prince, Ginsberg, and Pacifica advise, are to
Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a premise, I should suppose, that a

State may deprive children of other rights-the right to marry, for example, or
the right to vote-deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for

adults.
Id. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
268. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
269. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978).
270. See id. at 749.
271. Id. at 750 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)); see also
id. at 747 & n.25.
272. Assessments for purposes of allocating rights and responsibilities are of two kinds:
class-wide, without evaluation of personal capabilities, and individual, with evaluation of
personal capabilities. See Diamond, supra note 244, at 492. When the rights of children are
at stake, assessments frequently are class-wide in nature. See id. For example, states are
free to prohibit "minors," a group of children defined to be under a specified age, from
driving, voting, and marrying. See id.; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
273. Children are different in terms of vulnerability and competency, as well as in
terms of parental control. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also Freeman,
supra note 250, at 30 ("Minors often lack full capacity to make choices in an intelligent,
rational, and independent manner.") (footnote omitted).
274. In family law, child custody determinations must be made pursuant to the best
interests of the child. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 1990).
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advance individual growth, autonomy, and self-actualization. 5
The goal of the public schools, therefore, is not to create "enclaves
of totalitarianism "276 or to foster homogeneous students, 7 but to
provide pre-college students with environments conducive to
learning and personal development. Limitations on pre-college
students' First Amendment rights to further this objective by fostering pluralism and establishing equality pose no constitutional
objection.27 8
The above trilogy of cases establishes the basic proposition
that the state may limit the First Amendment rights of children in
order to protect them. Viewed in the context of hate speech in
the public schools, Prince, Ginsberg,and Pacifica strongly support
the conclusion that hate speech may be regulated because of its
detrimental effect on students and school atmosphere.2 7 9 Tinker
(the seminal case on the First Amendment rights of public school
students), Fraser, and Kuhimeier confirm this conclusion based
upon varying doctrinal approaches, each analytically distinct, but
all recognizing and approving the inculcative function of the public' schools and providing them with the requisite authority to proscribe hate speech.
In the realm of First Amendment jurisprudence and the public schools, Tinker is a milestone, for it embodies the Court's unequivocal view that pre-college students possess free speech rights
within the school environment.28 0 In Tinker the Court considered the First Amendment rights of three junior high and senior
high school students who wore black armbands to school to protest
the Vietnam War and who were suspended by school officials for
refusing to remove them.2 8 1 The Court held that the school offi275. See Keiter, supra note 246, at 43.
276. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) ("In our system, stateoperated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.").
277. See id.
278. In one commentator's opinion, Ginsberg alone "provides strong support for the
proposition that the public school can... limit the access of children to ideas, beliefs, and
materials that are considered deleterious to our youth." Freeman, supra note 250, at 31.
279. See supra notes 260-71 and accompanying text.
280. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 ("It can hardly be argued that ... students.., shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.");
Keiter, supra note 246, at 39 (Tinker "represents the Court's strongest endorsement of
[F]irst [A]mendment rights for children.").
281. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. In the well-known facts of Tinker, three public school
students, ages thirteen to sixteen, were suspended from school for wearing black armbands
during school hours to publicize their objections to the Vietnam conflict. Id. School officials
suspended them pursuant to a school policy providing that any student wearing an
armband in school would be asked to remove it and, in the event of a refusal, would be
suspended from school until such time as he or she returned to school without the armband.
Id. The school adopted the policy after learning that the three students planned to wear
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cials impermissibly exceeded the constitutional limits of their comprehensive educational authority because "there . . . [was] no
evidence whatever of ... [the students'] interference, actual or
nascent, with the schools' work or of a collision with the rights of

other students to be secure and to be let alone. ' 28 2 In reaching
this conclusion, and in simultaneously establishing it as the test for
ascertaining the degree to which student expression in school must

be tolerated, the Court explicitly acknowledged the singular role
of the public schools 283 and the paradox created when the First
Amendment rights of public school students interfere with the
need of schools to maintain order and a certain pedagogical atmosphere.2 8 4 Thus, while Tinker extended constitutional protections
to elementary and secondary school students,2 5 its standard
plainly provides less free speech protection for students in the
school than is afforded adults."6
The Court's discussion in Tinker focuses on speech as necessary for citizen participation and the open debate of ideas and
views.2 8 7 The Court's emphasis is on communication of political
arinbands as an act of protest and just days before the three students actually wore them to
school. Id.
282. Id. at 508; see also id. at 514 (The students "neither interrupted school activities
nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others.").
283. See id. at 506 (noting the "special characteristics of the school environment").
284. See id. at 507 (recognizing the need for delegating comprehensive authority to
the states and school officials to operate the schools and recognizing that problems occur "in
the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of
the school authorities"). The enigma, of course, is that the educational objective of teaching
children about the virtues of democratic values would seem to preclude restrictions on
their free speech rights.
285. In an oft-cited passage, the Court explained in dictum that students are not the
mere pawns of school administrators and teachers:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in
school as well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They are
possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students
may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those
sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to
freedom of expression of their views.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
286. See Levin, supra note 60, at 1662 ("The Tinker standard clearly provides less
protection for free expression in the special environment of the schools than is available to
the ordinary citizen."). Under the Tinker standard, the school's authority to regulate
expression is dependent on the reactions of other students, reactions which are gauged in
terms of the disruption of school activities or the intrusiveness into students' lives, thereby
giving effect to the heckler's veto, a result generally not countenanced in First Amendment
jurisprudence governing adults. See id.
287. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 510-12, 514 (discussing political viewpoints and future
leaders "trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas .
) (citation
omitted).
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viewpoints and personal intercommunication among students as a
vehicle of personal growth.28 Precisely because the speech at
issue was of a "'pure"political variety, however, the Court was not
presented with concerns for the psychological and physical health

of children as it previously had been in Prince and Ginsberg. 9
Tinker, therefore, does not detract from the central message of
Prince, Ginsberg, and Pacifica that the state's interest in protecting children is of utmost importance and that limitations on chil-

dren's First Amendment freedoms are necessary at times to
further that interest. 9 0
The Tinker standard itself belies any such conclusion. Under
the test set forth in Tinker, student speech that "materially dis-

rupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others is... not immunized by the constitutional guaran-

tee of freedom of speech."'29 1 When student speech materially disrupts school activities or involves substantial disorder, the school's
need to maintain order, to establish a positive learning environment, and to protect children takes precedence over students'
rights of expression. Similarly, when student speech invades the
rights of others, that is, hinders the ability of others "to be secure

and to be let alone,

'2 92 the

school's interests in protecting students

from physical and psychological harm outweighs students' rights of

expression.2 93 Under Tinker, therefore, speech-even political
288. See generally Garvey, supra note 259, at 338-39 (arguing that in Tinker the Court
envisioned students' free speech rights to be instrumental in nature, that is, allowing
students to express political opinions today to further their self-development so that as
adults they will be responsible members of society); Keiter, supra note 246, at 39 (arguing
that in Tinker "[tihe Court recognized that although children might not presently
participate in the political process, it is appropriate for the state through its schools to foster
an appreciation and understanding on their part of the political and social milieu and the
dynamics of change"). Commentators have observed that the extent to which Tinker
suggests that students' free speech rights obviously flow from the right to communicate and
to influence others on political issues and matters of public policy, the rights are illusory, for
students who have not reached their eighteenth birthday have diminished legal capacity
and do not enjoy the right to vote. See Garvey, supra note 259, at 338-39; Mark Tushnet,
Free Expression and the Young Adult: A ConstitutionalFramework, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 746,
753-54 & n.36.
289. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court apparently
was not convinced that the state actually was protecting students from the exploitative
practices of others and that school authorities were seeking to assist parents by its policy,
but was persuaded that the students were sufficiently mature to face and consider the
political viewpoints that the school sought to suppress. See Keiter, supra note 246, at 41-42.
290. Cf.Keiter, supra note 246, at 43 (the Ginsberg line of cases does not undercut the
rationale of Tinker).
291. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. The Court did not provide examples of material
disruption, substantial disorder, or invasions of the rights of others. See Levin, supra note
60, at 1662.
292. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508; see also id. at 514 ("invasion of the rights of others"
defined as intruding into the lives of others).
293. Some have suggested that the "invasion of the rights of others" prong of Tinker
requires the commission of a tortious act by one student against another, such as a battery
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speech-can be regulated at that point when it disrupts the learning processes or intrudes upon other students and affects their
feelings of security.
Tinker provides support for the regulation of hate speech in
the public schools.294 Under the first prong of the standard established in that case, elementary and secondary school officials may
proscribe hate speech and sanction abusive epithets and slurs
when they have knowledge of facts causing them to anticipate (or
to forecast) 295 that such speech will materially disrupt classwork or
result in substantial disorder. 96 Several lower courts, applying the
disruption prong, have held that certain expressive symbols, school
songs, and team names, the Confederate flag, the song "Dixie,"
and the name "Rebels," for example, may be proscribed due to
their offensiveness
and potentially disruptive presence in the edu2 97
setting.
cational
or libel, resulting in potential liability for the school. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 280-90 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 65, at
640-41. The Supreme Court, however, has not adopted this position. See Kuhlmeer, 484
U.S. at 273 n.5 (Because the Court did not rely on the Tinker standard in resolving the issue
presented, it did "not decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed Tinker as
precluding school officials from censoring student speech to avoid 'invasion of the rights of
others,'. . . except where the speech could result in tort liability to the school.").
294. In his dissenting opinion in Tinker, Justice Black, in the context of Meyer and the
rights of teachers to teach the subjects of their choice, commented on derogatory epithets
and slurs, strongly urging that they have no place in elementary and secondary schools:
The truth is that a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school
pupils no more carries into a school with him a complete right to freedom of
speech and expression than an anti-Catholic or anti-Semite carries with him a
complete freedom of speech and religion in a Catholic church or Jewish
synagogue.... It is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say
what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 521-22 (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
295. See id. at 509, 514 (In order to regulate student speech, school officials must
articulate facts showing that the forbidden speech "would" result in a material or
substantial disruption or the invasion of the rights of others or that they have reason "to
anticipate" or "to forecast" such consequences.).
296. Cf Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (Public school officials may discipline student for lewd and vulgar expression in
order to prevent disruption of school educational activities.). Professor Diamond has
asserted that the Court in Tinker viewed disruption, as a criterion triggering permissible
school regulation of speech, in a purely physical sense, when in fact disruption of the school
environment may be other than physical in nature. See Diamond, supra note 244, at 485.
For this reason, he has argued that educational and psychological disruption also are
sufficient to trigger constitutionally permissible regulation, for school administrators have a
"right to protect students from exposure to pernicious values." Id. at 502-05 (footnote
omitted). Justice Brennan's position in Kuhlmeier is strikingly similar to Professor
Diamond's argument.
297. See, e.g., Augustus v. School Bd., 507 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that under
Tinker a public school may proscribe the use of the Confederate flag as a school symbol and
the use of the name "Rebels" in conjunction with athletic teams and extracurricular
activities because of racial tension and potential disruption); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d
1332 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that under Tinker schools may prohibit the use of offensive
symbols, like the Confederate flag as the school flag, "Rebels" as the team name, and
"Dixie" as the school pep song, in school circumstances filled with racial tension, and may
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The second prong of the Tinker standard also provides a regulatory justification for the public schools, on the premise that abusive epithets and slurs intrude into the lives of the students against
whom they are directed, severely and unfairly restricting their
sense of security and their right to be let alone. On this view, the
detrimental psychological impact of hate speech-the immediate
affront to dignity and loss of security and the long-term feelings of
inferiority-and the state's compelling interest in protecting children from such psychological harm receive full recognition.
A plausible rejoinder to the conclusion that Tinker provides
the public schools with ample constitutional authority to regulate
hate speech is the argument that such a conclusion is contrary to
Tinker's central tenet: schools may not confine student expression
to "those sentiments that are officially approved. ' 298 A prohibition
on hate speech, abusive epithets calculated to convey negative
messages and to hurt, however, is not like the prohibition in
Tinker, which singled out a particular symbol connected to a particular political issue. 29 9 The Court in Tinker expressly noted that
the school policy in issue did not purport to prohibit the wearing
of all politically-charged symbols, but instead proscribed only the
wearing of black armbands to oppose the United States' involvement in Vietnam. 30 0 The Court's concern in Tinker with efforts by
school officials to restrict student expression on specific political or
controversial issues simply is not implicated by hate speech regulations prohibiting all abusive epithets and slurs based upon race,
ethnic origin, religion, sex, and sexual preference.
In thinking about hate speech and the public schools, we must
keep in mind that abusive epithets and slurs are different from
suspend students for wearing clothing bearing the Confederate flag, on the ground of
preventing potential danger and disruption), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); Guzick v.
Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding, under Tinker, a school's rule prohibiting
students from wearing all buttons supporting a cause or bearing messages unrelated to their
education-including buttons bearing political messages and racially divisive messagesbecause of the possibility of disorder), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
298. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511; cf. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) (public schools may not compel students to salute the flag).
299. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11. Accordingly, hate speech regulations are not
viewpoint-specific. Contra American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnit, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (court struck down an anti-pornography ordinance
because the court concluded that it discriminated on the basis of viewpoint); Thomas C.
Grey, DiscriminatoryHarassment and Free Speech, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 161
(1991) (prohibitions on hate speech like the Stanford regulation draw objections from civil
libertarians because they seem to violate neutrality: they are not content-neutral and they
appear to lack viewpoint neutrality); cf. Sherry, supra note 66, at 933 (almost all of the
university regulations adopted to punish hate speech "'are extremely broad and obviously
content-based").
300. Id.
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other forms of speech in terms of the speaker's purpose and moti-

vation and the effect of the spoken words on the listener. Abusive
epithets are different because they are calculated to inflict injury
and they do inflict injury. In recognizing hate speech as harmful
and in seeking its regulation, however, we need not dispense with
our belief that freedom of expression for public school students in
a democracy is fundamental and good. Rather, as Tinker instructs,
we must ensure that school officials take action to proscribe abu-

sive language when, in fact, it is abusive or disruptive.
The Tinker requirement of balancing the First Amendment
rights of elementary and secondary students against the public
schools' need to maintain a certain kind of order within the learn-

ing environment no longer remains the sole analytic model. In
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser30 1 the Court pursued a
new doctrinal approach. There a high school student delivered a
campaign speech nominating a classmate for student office.3" 2
The speech, given during a school-sponsored assembly at which

approximately six hundred high school students between the ages
of fourteen and eighteen were present, made reference to the student candidate "in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. 30 3 Acting pursuant to a school regulation

prohibiting the use of obscene and profane language,30 4 and after
a disciplinary hearing during which the hearing officer deter-

mined that the speech was "indecent, lewd, and offensive, to the
modesty and decency of many of the students and faculty in
attendance at the assembly," 30 5 school officials suspended the student and removed his name from the list of candidates for graduation speaker.3 °6
The Supreme Court upheld the actions of the school officials,
holding that the First Amendment does not prevent a public
301. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
302. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
303. Id. at 677-78.
304. Id. at 678. The school disciplinary rule provided in full as follows: "Conduct
which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited,
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Id.
305. Id. at 678-79.
306. See id. The hearing officer affirmed the school officials' decision that suspension
was the appropriate discipline. See id. at 679. Matthew Fraser, the student who gave the
speech, then brought suit in federal district court, alleging a violation of § 1983 of Title 42
of the United States Code. See id. The district court held that the school's disciplinary
actions violated Fraser's First Amendment right to freedom of speech, that the school's
regulation was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that the school's removal of
Fraser's name from the list of candidates for graduation speaker constituted a violation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the district court, holding that Tinker controlled and that Fraser's speech
was indistinguishable from the armbands in that case. See id. at 679-80.
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school from disciplining a student for giving a lewd and vulgar
speech at a school assembly.3 0 The Court's reasoning proceeded
along two lines. First, the Court rejected out of hand the argument that Tinker was controlling, finding that it was incorrect to
equate lewd and obscene speech with the constitutionally protected political message of the armbands in Tinker.3 °8 Moreover,
the Court concluded that, unlike the school action in Tinker, the
school disciplinary action was unrelated to any political viewpoint.30 9 Second, the Court reasoned that while the fundamental
values of democratic society require tolerance of diverse religious
and political views, even those views that are considered by many
to be unpopular, those fundamental values also mandate "tak[ing]
into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the
case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students. 3 1 0 In other
words, the fundamental values "disfavor the use of terms of debate
highly offensive or highly threatening to others." 3 1 ' Against this
backdrop, the Court held that lewd and vulgar speech within the
public schools was wholly inconsistent with the values of public
school education and an impediment to the fulfillment of the basic
educational mission. 3 12 School officials, therefore, appropriately
had disassociated the school from the lewd and vulgar content of
31 3
the student's speech.
The Court's discussion in Fraserabout the importance of protecting the sensibilities of students and the permissibility of proscribing words that are highly offensive or highly threatening to
students has important implications for the hate speech debate.
Indeed, the expansive language of the decision powerfully suggests that the Court would view hate speech in the public schools
in the same way that it views lewd and vulgar speech within the
public schools, for the student who directs an abusive epithet
307. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 685.
308. See id. at 680.
309. Id. at 685.
310. Id. at 681. The Court added that "[e]ven the most heated political discourse in a
democratic society requires consideration for the personal sensibilities of the other
participants and audiences." Id.
311. Id. at 683.
312. See Fraser,478 U.S. at 685-86.
313. See id. In his concurring opinion, justice Brennan applied the disruption prong of
the Tinker standard and concluded that:
in light of the discretion school officials have to teach high school students how to
conduct civil and effective public discourse, and to prevent disruption of school
educational activities, it was not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude,
under the circumstances of this case, that [the student's] remarks exceeded
permissible limits.
Id. at 687-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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against another intends to offend or to threaten, precisely because
of the other's sensibilities.
Yet a third doctrinal approach, distinct from both Tinker and
Fraser,was employed by the Court in Hazelwood School Districtv.
Kuhlmeier.31 4 In Kuhlmeier the Court held that with respect to
school-sponsored expression, such as "school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school, ' 31 5 that is, activities
3 16
that fairly may be characterized as part of the curriculum,

school officials may regulate the style and the content of expression
"so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. '3 17 When a school acts in its capacity as a publisher or an editor, when it in some sense is the speaker, it may "set
high standards for the student speech that is disseminated under
its auspices-standards that may be higher than those demanded
by some newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the 'real'
world-and may refuse to disseminate student speech that does
not meet those standards.

'3 1'

Accordingly, a school may disassoci-

ate itself from speech that substantially interferes with the school's
work; that impinges upon the rights of other students; that is
ungrammatical, poorly written, and inadequately researched; that
is vulgar, profane, or unsuitable for student audiences; and, signifi31 9
cantly, that is "biased or prejudiced."

Student expression that is biased or prejudiced-including
hate speech-may be regulated when it is part of the school curriculum or bears the school's imprimatur. The Court's introduction
314. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The Court noted that it was not applying the Tinker
standard. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988). In dissent,
Justice Brennan argued that the Court inappropriately abandoned the Tinker test. Id. at
282-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 271.
316. See id.
317. Id. at 273 (footnote omitted). In Kuhlmeier the school principal directed the
advisor of a school-sponsored student newspaper to delete two pages containing stories on
divorce and pregnancy. Id. at 264. The Court upheld his actions, holding that the
newspaper was not a public forum because school officials never established it for
indiscriminate use by the public or students, and, thus, school officials could regulate its
content in any reasonable manner. See id. at 269-70.
318. Id. at 271-72.
319. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271 (emphasis added). Even Justice Brennan in dissent
agreed that educators need not sponsor the publication of speech that is "'ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,' or that falls short of the
'high standards for . . . student speech that is disseminated under [the school's] auspices
.... "Id.
at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority in Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. at
271). He argued that such expression in a student newspaper, for example, could be
regulated under Tinker, for it would materially disrupt the newspaper's curricular function.
Id. at 283-84.
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of public forum analysis into the First Amendment jurisprudence
of the public schools stands, and constitutes a distinct doctrinal
approach. It expands on the Fraser principle that the public
schools have the authority to disassociate themselves from certain
forms of student expression. Kuhimeier thus provides additional
constitutional approval for the regulation of hate speech in the
public schools.
Doctrine established by the Supreme Court to govern the
operation of the public schools vis-a-vis the First Amendment consists of an. array of analytic models. As the above discussion has
sought to show, prevailing constitutional doctrine affords school
officials with several regulatory rationales and sufficient latitude to
prohibit abusive epithets and slurs should they so choose. The
harms caused by hate speech and the educational mission of the
public schools, a mission that includes teaching students about
respect for others and fostering pluralism and equality, are persuasive reasons for concluding that schools ought to regulate hate
speech within the school environment.3 2 0
IV.

CONCLUSION

Hate speech affects people in negative ways. When abusive
epithets and slurs are a part of playground, lunchroom, hallway, or
classroom communications, elementary and secondary public
school students are harmed in significant ways and the learning
process is impaired. The presence of hate speech also means that
the public school, while honoring First Amendment norms of free
speech, has failed to promote the constitutional value of equality,
'aswell as other highly prized values such as civility and tolerance,
to the full extent possible. Hate speech regulations are premised
on the underlying theory that equality and the other values of our
society must be furthered, lest our commitment to free speech
principles overpower our commitment to other important values.
To date, the hate speech conundrum has been viewed in the
context of society and the context of post-secondary educational
institutions. Proponents of regulation have sought to make us
320. Many commentators have concluded that hate speech has no place in the public
schools and should be subject to regulation. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 244, at 502;
Freeman, supra note 250, at 60 n.360; Garvey, supra note 259, at 361-64; Smolla, supra
note 9, at 205-06. In addition, the American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards
Project would allow restrictions on student speech that "advocates racial, religious, or
ethnic prejudice or discrimination or seriously disparages particular racial, religious, or
ethnic groups." INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS
PROJECT, STANDARDS
EDUCATION 4.2(C) & Commentary 84-91 (1977).

RELATING
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AND
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HATE SPEECH

think about conventional First Amendment doctrines in new
ways. The debate has made us feel uncomfortable, not because we
view equality as less important than free speech, but because we
value them both and because the idea of restrictions on speech is
contrary to our strongly held liberal beliefs. Our uneasiness with
regulation, like our uneasiness with the tension between the libertarian and the communitarian visions, is informative, however, for
it clearly reveals that free speech as we currently know it is
neither neutral nor cost-free: to allow hate speech is to permit
some to speak freely at the expense of others. This outcome is
worrisome when we consider that it is imposed on the weaker and
more vulnerable by the stronger. At a minimum, the hate speech
conundrum teaches that we must not be cavalier about neutrality
and the First Amendment right of freedom of expression.
The public schools, however, do not present the same concerns to the same extent. They are different in important respects
from the world-at-large and from colleges and universities.
Largely due to the less developed nature of children and their lack
of capacity for autonomous decision making, in addition to the
unique function of the public schools, normative educational theory and constitutional law accord public school students fewer
rights than adults and do not demand complete neutrality on the
part of the schools. Precisely for this reason, and despite any
uneasiness that we may harbor concerning the promulgation of
such regulations at colleges and universities, the proposed justifications for college and university hate speech regulations provide
ample authority for elementary and secondary public school hate
speech regulations. Moreover, good educational policy founded
upon principles of nondiscrimination and nonrepression requires
that the public schools prohibit abusive epithets and slurs based
upon race, ethnic origin, religion, sex, or sexual preference in elementary and secondary public schools. Tinker, Fraser, and
Kuhlmeier provide no obstacle to the implementation of hate
speech regulations. To the contrary. Their rationales support
public school efforts to provide environments for learning and to
safeguard the sensibilities of elementary and secondary students.
We can implement hate speech regulations in the public schools,
regulations designed to protect students and to encourage learning, and yet remain true to our liberal principles of freedom of
expression.

